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1. Introduction 
"War always interested me: not war in the sense of maneuvers devised by great generals … but the reality 
of war, the actual killing. I was more interested to know in what way and under the influence of what feeling 
one soldier kills another than to know how the armies were arranged at Austerlitz and Borodino." 
- Leo Tolstoy.1 
 
1.1. Research Question and Context 
This study is about the British middle-class men who, upon the outbreak of the Great 
War, volunteered in lord Kitchener’s Army during the years 1914–16 before the nation 
turned to conscription in 1916 for the lack of willing fighting-aged men as they continued 
to perish on the battlefields.2 Kitchener’s army was an army of civilian soldiers, drafted 
to fill in the ranks of the – at the time – inadequately sized British army.3 The call to arms 
was made by the newly appointed Secretary of War, Lord Kitchener, whose name was 
consequently carried by the newly formed troops. The Great War is recognized as the first 
industrial war, and it is a unique event to study from the grassroots perspective, as both 
the outdated British military organization and the civilian soldiers themselves had to learn 
and adapt to the ways of modern warfare as they went along. For the British, it was the 
largest war in history by almost any measure, mobilizing a total of 5,7 million men over 
the course of its four-year duration.4 It was also the first time that Britain fought a war 
with armies made up mostly of volunteers and conscripts, drafted to fill and replace the 
ranks of the professional army that preceded the Great War.5 This study will examine the 
war in its entirety – as far as the British were concerned – from 1914 to 1918. The main 
emphasis will however be on the first two years of the war, during which Kitchener’s 
volunteers were the most prominent part of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) 
fighting on the Western Front. The purpose of this study is to understand how the war 
affected the soldiers, and why they reacted to it the way they did. 
Before the Great War, military historians seldom concerned themselves with the question 
of war from the point of view of combatants. Following the Thucydidean tradition, which 
deals with the observable reality of battles as events and the wider societal and political 
                                                          
1 In the foreword to The Raid in Tolstoy, Maude 1999, 1. 
2 Ferguson 2003, 198. 
3 Or more precisely a collection of armies, as the influx of volunteers made for several army-sized units. Simkins 2007, 39. 
4 Holmes 2004, 138. 
5 In 1914 The British Army consisted of three, initially distinct, types of units – Regular, Territorial, and New (or ‘Kitchener’s’) Army 
– the last of which is discussed in this study. 
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implications of conflicts, the human cost of war in these histories has mostly been present 
in casualty figures.6 Within this framework, the only immaterial concept of any 
significance that directly relates to the soldiers has been morale, regarded mostly through 
its tactical utility as an asset that, should it be ensured, can be taken advantage of for 
maximum material gain.7 Though this dispassionate tradition of military history has never 
been completely abandoned, the Great War brought in its wake a new perspective to the 
study of warfare, consequently reshaping the understanding of the relationship between 
war and its combatants. This new branch of military history, which provides the 
framework for this study as well, has shifted the focus from recording armed conflict and 
their impact on societies to the level of the combatants themselves as they are affected by 
the realities of war.  
Over the course of the century since the end of the Great War, its events have been 
overlaid with scores of interpretations and narratives so ingrained in the general 
consciousness that their objectivity can be difficult to gauge. Partially due to this pitfall 
of an established narrative especially in the British context, those who seek to understand 
the soldiers’ experience on their own terms can and have fallen prey to the soldiers’ 
inspired descriptions of the battlefield if the impression given has been favorable to their 
own research agenda.8 Samuel Hynes, one of the more prestigious of the ‘modern war’ 
historians, has introduced the idea that if you added up all the stories told by soldiers 
about modern war, you would end up with one master narrative – the one tale about the 
other-worldliness of war.9 This notion distills the approach taken by many of the 
historians who focus on the psychological and sociological sides of the Great War: First, 
the voices of individuals are emphasized; and second, from the individual voices a 
unifying narrative is sought out – a story to answer one’s question in a manner that would 
reveal something profound about the nature of war.10 It is in this desire, unconscious or 
not, where the greatest risk of error lies for studies that follow this historiographical 
tradition; and simply by the virtue of trying to answer the question ‘why’ certain events 
occurred, this study is not immune to this risk either. 
                                                          
6 Of the 5,7 million Britons who served in the war, Britain lost approximately 11,8 percent, and by the end of the war as much 43 
percent had become casualties (including the wounded, missing, and captured). See Watson 2008, 20. 
7 Grinker & Spiegel defined morale as ‘the psychological forces within a combat group which impel its members to get into the fight’, 
and it is this vision which defines the use of the word in this study as well. See Grinker & Spiegel 1945. 
8 Paul Fussell has often been at the specifically harsh receiving end of this criticism, likely due to how ubiquitously quoted his book 
The Great War and Modern Memory has become. 
9 Winter & Prost 2005, 182. 
10 Special attention is usually also given to the view of combatants as humans first, soldiers second. 
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The psychological experience of the middle-class soldiers in Kitchener’s army was the 
result of their cultural context acting as influence in conjunction with the unconscious 
psychological mechanisms which manifest themselves under certain circumstances 
mostly regardless of the person’s social context.11 The world which Kitchener’s middle-
class volunteers left behind as they joined the war was designed to answer to their most 
basic needs. Their civilian selves’ primary concerns likely stemmed from questions of 
their social status, as they were judged upon the nature of their character, which was in 
turn measured by how they adhered to the contemporary values of the British middle 
class. During the war, they had to adopt a soldier’s identity alongside their civilian selves, 
which in turn was shaped by the social circumstances of the front and the contemporary 
military culture. Their reactions to the following wartime events reflect the intermingling 
of both identities. At the same time, both before and especially during the war these men 
were subject to psychological mechanisms which guided their reactions and behavior in 
relation to their environment. The interplay between the soldiers’ mental processes and 
their conscious decisions deriving from the values which they had adopted through their 
cultural upbringing created their war experience, nuanced and apart from all other groups 
of soldiers who shared the Western Front with them. 
Wars have all but vanished, and thus the psychological experience of soldiers in the Great 
War is an important topic for historians to re-examine in the light of modern research to 
better understand the course, the outcome, and the aftermath of the war. Furthermore, it 
is also a critical area of study to further the understanding about how the soldiers’ 
experience was shaped by the conjoined effects of their broader cultural context and the 
biological mechanisms which have influenced people in history regardless of time and 
place – now that the science of psychology has taken several leaps forward during the last 
few decades. However, as a result of the limitations and challenges of the primary sources, 
and of psychology not being an exact science, the interpretations of the historians who 
have chosen this theoretical framework have not always aligned with each other. The 
soldier’s experience from the psychologically charged perspective has recently been 
studied by historians such as Joanna Bourke, Niall Ferguson, and Alexander Watson. 
Though all three and others who have chosen this approach have somewhat varying 
interpretations of the psychological implications of the soldiers’ self-narrated 
experiences, they nevertheless have also all on their part captured some essential features 
                                                          
11 In the context of this study, these instances will mostly involve group dynamics and stressful combat environment. 
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of the Kitchener’s soldiers war experience and brought it into the academic discussion, 
which had previously been saturated by the traditional narrative of the Great War. On this 
merit alone, further research of the source material and the examination of these questions 
by drawing upon the previous perspectives is warranted. 
The traditional narrative of the Great War in Britain, which evolved into a cultural 
consciousness focusing on the ‘lunacy’ of the war, can be detected back to the 
disillusionment that engulfed the nation after the glow of victory had faded and the public 
was left with a lot of resentment towards the overall human price of the war.12 The way 
the war was treated by the press, politicians, and by popular authors transformed after the 
war from the shared patriotic ethos into criticism that had received no platform while the 
war was still going on. In the prevailing atmosphere, the public was eager to latch onto 
eloquent aphorisms such as poet Ted Hughes’ remark that Britain’s victory in the Great 
War was ‘no victory at all, rather it was a defeat around whose neck someone stuck a 
victory medal.’13 Great War historian John Keegan’s Face of battle first published in 1976 
arguably started the historiographical tradition of making the soldier – specifically his 
behavior in battle – a central question in the writing of the histories of the Great War.14 
More recent historians have begun to give more attention not just to their behavior, but 
their emotional world as well, which subsequently challenged these previous notions of 
the war’s ubiquitous catatonia.15 They have veered from the more pessimistic analyses as 
they have re-examined the sources and made novel interpretations emphasizing the 
positive (or at least, manageable) aspects of the war in favour of the traditional narrative. 
While some historians have drawn conclusions of soldiers genuinely enjoying the war, 
this study follows the more moderate path of the Great War revisionists, of which 
Alexander Watson is one of the best examples: After studying both the British and 
German armies in the Great War, he nevertheless concluded that while the conditions 
were by and large abhorrent to the combatants, in the end they endured remarkably well.16 
The aim of this study is to examine the soldiers’ experience in the trenches of the Western 
Front and to discover the reasons for their reactions to the war. After the Introduction, it 
approaches this question by focusing on the two most significant external factors which 
                                                          
12 Winter & Prost 2005, 183. Keegan 2011, 315. 
13 Winter & Prost 2005, 190. 
14 ibid., 27. 
15 See Bourke 2000; Winter 1988; Grossman 1995; etc. 
16 Watson 2008, 43. 
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affected the soldiers’ war circumstances in a by-and-large positive or sustaining way in 
Chapter 2 (the military organization and their brothers in arms), after which their 
reactions the two most prominent battlefield stressors in Chapter 3 (the act of killing and 
the threat of dying) are examined. The concepts of psychological defense and coping 
mechanisms are carried throughout the study, and the interpretations of the soldiers’ 
reactions are therefore tied to them at every turn, in accordance to the study’s theoretical 
framework. 
 
1.2. Theoretical Framework and Method 
Historians have always been partial to the long running psychological debate of nature 
versus nurture by striving to understand certain events through the interplay of culture 
and the universal features of humanity.17 This study’s theoretical framework draws from 
a psycho-sociological tradition of historiography, examining how various features of the 
Great War were received by the soldiers, and whether they weighed on the soldiers’ 
psyche and enacted as hardships to overcome, or as support which helped them endure 
the more stressful aspects of their war experience. This approach relies on modern 
research on both the cognitive processes of an individual, and of larger group dynamics 
and their effects on the group’s members. History is however not – neither does it attempt 
to be – a branch of psychology. Ute Frevert, a specialist in the history of emotions, has 
elaborated the relationship of the two fields regarding historical research: 
Historians differ from present-day psychologists in the fact that they pay more attention to social emotions 
and how these play out in relational and collective settings. While most branches of psychology focus on 
the individual person who is, however, stripped of all individual traits and peculiarities, history looks at 
individuals in their capacity as members of social groups and institutions, as bearers of culture, as subjects 
of and to power.18 
As such, the way this study approaches the relationship between cultural and biological 
influencers is grounded in the social context of the middle-class soldiers in Kitchener’s 
army, using psychological research only as a tool of acquiring a more comprehensive 
understanding of the soldiers’ experience in the trenches of the Western Front. 
This theoretical framework is especially suited to analyzing the study’s primary sources 
by minding the biases implicit in the soldiers’ self-written records, which may have 
                                                          
17 The debate boils down to whether human behavior is determined by a person’s environment, or by their genes. 
18 Frevert 2011, 24. 
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resulted from their cultural norms and subsequent unconscious psychological reactions to 
the described events. Regarding this study’s sources, the context of the Great War brings 
with it a demand for a highlighted attention to the effects of the latter. Michael Roper, a 
historian who specializes in psychological questions of trauma and war, has declared that 
historians of trench warfare ‘have not properly appreciated the psychological imperatives 
of writing and the range of emotions that trench warfare could arouse.’19 In stating this, 
he was emphasizing the importance of literary analysis on the primary sources from the 
trenches, but the statement also implies that an understanding of combat psychology has 
the potential to provide additional insight to the analysis of the soldiers’ texts. The most 
important benefit to using this framework to study the soldiers’ accounts of their Great 
War experience is thus to gain a deeper understanding of what the soldiers were 
undergoing by being able to detect the unconscious mechanisms guiding the soldiers’ 
reactions to their circumstances, despite of their own obliviousness to them. For example, 
in a statement similar in fashion to Roper’s, historian of psychology Edgar Jones has 
observed regarding the question of killing in combat that readers cannot be certain that 
an author is sending a straightforward message, when the subject matter is as emotive as 
this.20 As such, it is left for the historian to do their best to get to the implicit messages in 
the soldiers’ writings. 
The key terms used in this study in reference to the psychological phenomena of group 
behavior and stress responses are concepts recognized on the field of psychological 
research either as defense or coping mechanisms. Where defense mechanisms are 
commonly understood as unconscious and automatic reactions of the mind to potentially 
stressful information, coping mechanisms are at least partially consciously driven and 
maintained by the person themselves to help them refrain from having to face and process 
the information which they know to be painful.21 Based on modern psychological 
research and the knowledge of the social context of the British middle-class soldiers, few 
of the most common defense and coping mechanisms have been identified and will 
frequently be referred to in this study. Most of these mechanisms fall under the broader 
concept of cognitive dissonance and they are, in no particular order: Rationalization, 
                                                          
19 Roper 2011, 430. 
20 Jones 2006, 233. 
21 Cramer 1998, 919–946. 
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group absolution, obedience to authority, enmification, positive illusions, 
religion/superstition, humour, and desensitization.22 
Rationalization is a process which reduces cognitive dissonance or moral inconsistencies 
caused by soldier’s own actions by providing seemingly rational justifications for them.23 
Group absolution is a concept that helps explain how individual soldiers bring themselves 
to commit acts of violence as parts of a group, through simultaneously providing a sense 
of accountability and anonymity.24 Obedience to authority as a concept has its origins in 
the infamous Milgram experiment, and it suggests an inherent tendency of humans to 
follow the orders of established authority figures, and as a result wash their hands of any 
subsequent guilt.25 Enmification is the process through which people dehumanize their 
adversaries and create psychological distance between themselves and their enemies.26 
Positive illusions are a cognitive bias which made the soldiers overestimate their chances 
of survival or otherwise view their circumstances in an unrealistically optimistic light.27 
Religion guarded the soldiers with a sense of security in an ultimate ‘plan’ for them, rather 
than them having to succumb to nihilism, while superstition gave them the impression 
that their survival was a matter of sticking to rituals. Humour is a way for people to 
communicate things which they cannot address in any other way, and as such provides a 
way of processing them without directly addressing their severity.28 Finally, 
desensitization refers to the decreasing of either certain emotions, or of a disconnect with 
one’s ethical sensibilities.29 
The research method used in this study follows the example of most of the other studies 
conducted about the soldiers of the Great War within the research tradition which focuses 
on individual soldiers’ experiences. Beginning with the close-reading of the letters and 
diaries left behind by the soldiers, their accounts are contextualized through historical 
                                                          
22 The term cognitive dissonance refers to the mental tension experienced by an individual who holds contradictory beliefs, ideas, 
values, or preferences at the same time. See Alós-Ferrer 2016, 324. 
23 For soldiers in war, rationalization process enables them to regain control of their reality, and allows them to move forward without 
being burdened by their reactions and actions. See Sekerdej 2016, 1435. 
24 Accountability to one’s comrades, and anonymity concerning the responsibility for the group’s actions. See Bennett 2016, 735–6. 
25 In the test, the psychologist Stanley Milgram succeeded in a laboratory experiment to coerce sixty-five percent of his participants 
into giving an imaginary (unbeknownst to them) victim a deadly electrical shock, See Dietrich 2016, 1063. 
26 Enmification as a coping mechanism in combat works to help soldiers construct distance between themselves and their enemies, 
which is crucial to be able to take part in the killing of said adversaries. See Sion 2016, 559. 
27 In the absence of a promise of security, certainty, and control in the practical world, men easily turned to the supernatural for comfort. 
See Watson 2008, 98. 
28 By defining humour as an element of communication and by thinking of resilience as a communication phenomenon, humour and 
resilience become linked. See Henman 2001, 89–94. 
29 Sometimes referred to as ‘numbing’, desensitization can either be voluntary reaction, a deliberate avoidance of certain traumatic 
triggers, or an involuntary one, relying on instinctive or unconscious avoidance mechanisms. See Isaac 2016, 487. 
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research literature about the war and the surrounding time period. The sources are then 
interpreted through both what knowledge of human psyche and behavior has been gained 
by modern psychological research, and the implications of the soldiers’ cultural context 
on their reactions to the war. While a handful of primary sources cannot be used to 
generalize the experience of whole armies, or even just the parts of it which consisted of 
British middle-class combatants, this method brings the historian as close to the actual 
experiences as they can get. By combining the information acquired from the primary 
sources with both the broader historiographical context of the Great War and the 
knowledge of the cognitive mechanisms of the human mind, this study aims to detect the 
larger trends of the studied theme of human experience in trench warfare, and 
contextualize them through the culture of the studied individuals. The cultural memory 
of the Great War intertwines history and literature in such a way that, in the words of the 
acclaimed military historian Richard Holmes, the war ‘usually enters our minds not as 
history, but as literature.’30 This intermingling suggests the mutual importance of both 
historiography and literary scholarship in understanding the writings that the war 
generated. 
In seeking to answer specific questions about the soldiers either as individuals or as 
members of a group, the Great War historians have produced different points of interest 
of the human mind and the social spheres that they have concentrated on: While John 
Keegan approached the dynamics of the trenches to explain why soldiers were prepared 
to fight, Tony Ashworth focused on the sociological aspects of the battlefield to explain 
the relationship between its soldiers on different sides of the conflict.31 In the meantime, 
several historians have studied the national character and the social structures of the pre-
war European nations on their quest to find out the reasons for the outcome of the war.32 
This study’s approach to its research question mirrors Alexander Watson’s approach to 
his own study, in which he suggests that the soldiers’ social influences coloured rather 
than shaped their psychological coping strategies on the field.33 As such, it emphasizes 
the intrinsic psychological mechanisms of the soldiers to their circumstances, but minds 
the influences of their middle-class background to distinguish their experience from all 
others who fought in the war. This theoretical framework is well-equipped to answer this 
                                                          
30 Holmes 2004, xvii. 
31 Keegan 1978, 207–89; Ashworth 1980. 
32 See Sheffield 2000, 72–3; Winter 1988, 159. 
33 Watson 2008, 8. 
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study’s main research question as it inquiries about the reactions of the soldiers to their 
circumstances, which are inherently grounded in their instincts and accumulated 
knowledge of the world. 
 
1.3. Key Research Literature and Source Material 
The primary sources analyzed in this study are the letters and diaries written by the British 
middle-class infantry soldiers while serving in the British Expeditionary Force on the 
Western Front. The Imperial War Museum in London has a national archive of 
unpublished war letters and diaries from this period, and their research room and staff 
were invaluable for the conducting of this study. Additionally, many of the soldiers’ 
accounts were published in the interwar period as an answer to the interest of the general 
public, despite it taking until the latter half of the century for the historians to express 
interest in the story told by the soldiers themselves.34 A large number of these accounts 
have since been digitized and uploaded by various archives, and are thus made easily 
accessible as well. Similar accounts of individual soldiers have also been continued to be 
transcribed and published over the century since the war, and some of these more recent 
publications of texts dating back to the war have also been utilized for the purposes of 
this study. Retrospective soldier memoirs, which gained popularity during the latter half 
of the century, were also discriminately used, with additional emphasis on the questions 
of their publication motivations and narrative intents, which were likely more influenced 
by the politics and historiographical traditions around the time of publication compared 
to the accounts which were published during or soon after the war was over. The two 
conditions which most influenced the decision over which sources were included in this 
study concerned when the accounts were written, and by whom: Most of the sources date 
back to the years 1914-1918 (even if some of them were published much later), and they 
were written by members of the infantry in Kitchener’s army who as civilians belonged 
to the British middle-class. 
                                                          
34 The absence of combat and combatants in the first decades of the Great War historiography is the result of the contemporary historians 
being too occupied with viewing the war from above: From the perspective of politics, diplomacy and generals. See Winter & Prost 
2005, 13–4. 
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Perhaps surprisingly, one of the distinguishing features of British historiography of the 
trenches is that it has largely focused the experiences of the working-class soldiers.35 The 
decision to restrict the study’s focus group to middle-class men without a colonial 
background was both a deviation from this tradition, as well as a pragmatic choice of 
narrowing down the sphere of cultural influences which could have guided the soldiers’ 
attitudes and reactions to certain events. Britain in 1914 was arguably the most class-
conscious nation in Europe, and the differences between working and middle-class 
members of the British society were large enough to suggest a whole different culture.36 
Nativity to a colony of Great Britain can similarly be seen as a heavy influence on a 
person’s cultural background, which led to the decision of excluding sources written by 
colonial troops. Not only were members of different societal groups segregated through 
the social norms they ascribed to, they also received differential treatment to each other 
from other members of society. At the time, even attempting to understand a different 
class members’ point of view could prove difficult: A case well-exemplified before the 
war by the young middle-class recruit Donald Hankey who, when he wished to study 
authentic working-class life and had to conclude that it would be impossible for him to 
do so in England, due to the chasm which existed between the classes everywhere in 
society.37 
Because the concept of ‘middle class’ has had varying meanings moving from one era 
and cultural area to another, its usage in this context warrants a disambiguation. The 
following excerpt from Jürgen Kocka’s book The Middle Class in Europe describes the 
term as it is used in this study’s context: 
The concept "middle class" comprises merchants, manufacturers, bankers, capitalists, entrepreneurs, and 
managers, as well as rentiers, together with their families … It also comprises the families of doctors, 
lawyers, ministers, scientists and other professionals, professors of universities and secondary schools, 
intellectuals, men and women of letters, and academics, including those who serve as administrators and 
officials in public and private bureaucracies.38 
As such, the definition excludes both nobility, lower-middle class people comprising of 
low- and middle-ranking salaried employees, and the masses of lower-class people in 
general. It should be noted, however, that even within the focus group of this study there 
                                                          
35 Most British historians seem to have been eager to hear the voices of the working-class, likely partially due to the fact that the 
historiographical shift which had lingered on the level of generals and politicians until the 1960’s was willingly brought to the ‘lowest’ 
possible level by focusing on the working-class soldiers. Winter & Prost 2005, 94. 
36 ibid. 
37 Instead he emigrated to Australia for a while to achieve his goal, and even then, reported to having succeeded only to ‘a very limited 
extent’. See Hankey 1917, 318. 
38 Kocka 1995, 784. 
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existed a myriad of ways in which people experienced the Great War. Factors such as the 
personalities of the soldiers would have undoubtedly created differences in the perception 
of individuals of discernibly comparable circumstances and backgrounds. Meanwhile, the 
decision to restrict this study’s perspective to the members of the infantry was a purely 
practical decision rising from the decision to study the trenches as battlefield 
environment, which the Western Front is still most famous for. 
The primary sources of this study can be divided into three distinct categories; letters 
from the front, trench diaries, and war memoirs. The key to interpreting letters and diaries 
is understanding that the only real difference between them is their audience. Letters are 
often and correctly viewed as narratives meant to convey a certain image of the writer’s 
character to the receiver; while the author of a diary is comparatively narrating a story of 
themselves to themselves. The motive for both still stems from the desire to validate and 
make sense of their own character through a coherent story. When the soldiers had time 
to write during the quiet periods of frontline service, they were attempting to construct a 
narrative which made the most sense to them. As this study is centered around answering 
the questions of how and why soldiers reacted to the trench environment of the Western 
Front, the way these topics were handled in the soldiers’ immediate accounts are viewed 
through the context of the highly traumatic events they involved. As primary sources, war 
letters and diaries provide as close a look into the soldiers’ psyche on the battlefield as 
the historian can achieve. 
Meanwhile, war memoirs are retrospective accounts written sometimes years after the 
events themselves, and thus they the authors can be expected to have had adequate amount 
of time in constructing a coherent narrative. Memory is always partially constructed, 
based on the information that remains in the long-term memory, the general knowledge 
of the reminiscer, and the social demands at the time of memory retrieval of the author. 
Thus, memories will often contain errors, and clichés present in the archetypal examples 
of stories similar to the ones remembered.39 Biographer Doris Lessing described the 
problems which arise out of studying the Great War from the perspective of memoirs as 
she described how her own father, a veteran of the Great War, used to reminisce: 
  
                                                          
39 Hyman & Loftus 1998. 
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His war memories were congealed in stories that he told again and again, with the same words and gestures, 
in stereotyped phrases. They were anonymous, general, as if they had come out of a communal war memoir. 
He met a German in no man’s land, but both slowly lowered their rifles and smiled and walked away. The 
Tommies were the salt of the earth, the British fighting man the best in the world. He had never known 
such comradeship.40 
In the Great War historiography, however, all three types of primary sources have 
traditionally been used together by historians to interpret the trench experience from the 
soldiers’ perspective. Their literary analysis in this study is supported by historical 
research into the cultural context of the war on various time periods, and psychological 
research which helps to understand the psychological mechanisms dictating the soldiers’ 
immediate reactions as partially subconscious actors. 
The historical research literature in this study is used to contextualize the research 
question within its wider historiographical context, as well as to see how the study’s 
central theme of human experience in the trenches has been approached by historians. 
Out of the historical literature used in the conducting of this study, the Great War historian 
Alexander Watson’s study Enduring the Great War. Combat, Morale and Collapse in the 
German and British Armies, 1914-1918 is the most nominal one, as his research approach 
most closely aligns with this study’s thematic framework by emphasizing the 
intermingling of the soldiers’ cultural context with their psychological realities.41 The 
authors who most helped to contextualize the primary sources within the larger context 
of the Western Front and the surrounding cultural environment were Richard Holmes 
with his book Tommy: the British soldier on the Western Front, 1914-1918 and Peter 
Simkins with his book Kitchener’s Army: The Raising of the New Armies 1914-1916.42 
Additionally, the discourse between different interpretations of the soldiers’ experience 
benefited greatly from the works of Niall Ferguson, Joanna Bourke, Edgar Jones, Denis 
Winter, and Dave Grossman to name a few. They and many others provided this study 
with their respective perspectives on the psychology of the trenches from a historian’s 
perspective, and brought new angles to either contest or align with.43 Finally, this study 
would not have been possible without the numerous psychological studies primarily from 
the field of military psychology, which have accumulated over the years ever since the 
Great War started up the interest towards soldier endurance and combat behavior on a 
larger scale.  
                                                          
40 Doris Lessing quoted in Bourke 2004, 478. 
41 Watson 2008. 
42 Holmes 2004; Simkins 2007. 
43 Bourke 2000; Bourke 2005; Jones 2006; Grossman 1995. 
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2.  The Respite of War 
“An army, like any other human society, is an organism, whose well-being depends on the interplay of 
human relationships.” 
- Great War officer A.D. Thorburn.44 
 
2.1. The Military Organization 
When the Great War broke out in 1914, Britain originally had around a hundred thousand 
professional soldiers employed in the reserves. By the end of the first year of fighting, 
most of them had become incapable of continuing to fight either by dying off, or 
becoming war casualties of other kind. This shortage of men had already been anticipated 
before it occurred, and the reason for lord Kitchener’s call for volunteers at the very 
beginning of the war was primarily to help Britain remain in the war by ensuring it would 
not run out of fighting men.45 Within the first month after Britain joined the war, 
Kitchener called for a total of two hundred thousand men to volunteer for his new army, 
yet by the end of the month, he had already raised three hundred thousand.46 Ultimately, 
he would end up with two and a half million volunteers, of which twenty-nine percent 
joined within the first eight weeks of the war.47 Captain A.P.B. Irwin, who had made a 
career serving in the Regular Army, while he was overseeing the training of some of the 
Kitchener’s volunteers observed that ‘they arrived, a thousand strong, with no officers, 
no non-commissioned officers – rather like a football excursion crowd.’48 Another 
Regular Army officer described the unexpected and sudden influx by saying that ‘it was 
impossible to prevent new recruits coming. A company would start a route march 300 
strong and return with 310, and no one knew or could find out who were the new men.’49 
The middle-class draftees within this crowd came to occupy both the roles of officers and 
of the other ranks, and all of them had to be familiarized with the military institution and 
trained to be functional and ready soldiers for when they inevitably had to join the battle. 
In retrospect, it should not have been so surprising that the generations of twentieth 
century middle-class Britons were so eager to volunteer when they were called upon. For 
decades prior to the ignition of the Great War, British middle-class culture had been 
                                                          
44 Thorburn 1933, 5. 
45 Simkins 2007, 39. 
46 Ferguson 2003, 198. 
47 Around 25 percent of the male population who were eligible to fight, See Ferguson 2003, 198. 
48 Lieutenant-Colonel A.P.B. Irwin, quoted in Cecil & Liddle 2003, 298. 
49 Account by Major H.P Berney-Ficklin, quoted in Cecil & Liddle 2003, 298. 
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saturated by casual militarism, with young boys on the streets dressing up in sailor 
uniforms, and popular cigarette manufacturers including cards depicting famous generals 
and admirals in their packages.50 The militarization of British society before the Great 
War has been a contested topic between historians, but even Niall Ferguson, who has 
criticized what he calls the ‘myths of militarism’ in Britain at the time, has admitted that 
the middle-class men seem to have been ‘keener to fight’ than others.51 This was 
undoubtedly partially because the values of militarism were especially appealing to the 
prevailing middle-class values of hard work, sports, emotional control, masculinity, and 
honour.52 These values had a specifically effective platform of generational transmission 
in the public-school system of contemporary Britain, which had become particularly 
popular with the middle class, and has been speculated to have been the most significant 
unifying and exclusive experience for this class during the early twentieth century.53 
George Orwell, who himself was educated in Eton during the war, would go on to say 
that the British middle classes at the time were trained for war, ‘not technically, but 
morally.’54 With this he indicated that the ideological messages of the education put 
soldierly virtues on a pedestal, and emphasized the superiority of the British nation. 
Since Britain’s public schools were – contrary to the misleading name – privately owned 
with considerable admission fees, they were not a realistic option for the working classes; 
therefore, their purpose became disseminating the values of the upper and middle classes 
to the new generations.55 By the beginning of the twentieth century, there already existed 
a mutually fostered, tight link between the public schools and Britain’s War Office. A 
great majority of army officers were since the beginning of the century recruited through 
open competitive examinations, which required secondary level education in public 
schools for any realistic possibility of passing.56 This situation was deliberately 
engineered by the army. It was also enforced by the State’s public-school organization; 
by the army gearing their examinations to fit the school curriculum, and the curriculum 
being vice versa adjusted to fit the army’s requirements.57 The public-school education in 
                                                          
50 Otley 1978, 382; MacMillan 2013, 277. 
51 Ferguson 2003, 199. 
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57 Military training was provided within the public schools since I860, with it reaching a systematic national foothold in 1908 through 
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pre-war Britain was a fitting predecessor to the military organization as it was, above all 
else, aimed to make their students tough. John Honey, who has studied the British 
education of the time, has stated that there was ‘nothing ‘soft’, nothing ‘permissive’, 
nothing egalitarian; nothing remotely ‘child-centered’’ in the public schools at the time.58 
The underlying message was that life was a hard struggle, and boys had to prepare for 
that struggle from early on.59 It could be interpreted that – whether conscious or not – 
these boys were already being groomed into miniature soldiers. John Hay Beith belonged 
in the first of the Kitchener’s volunteers, and thus had a good vantage point of the initial 
training period the army had to offer. And indeed, he later recounted that his first days of 
service reminded him much of one’s first schooldays in Fettes College – and how there 
was the same fear of transgressing the unaltering and strict conventions of the formidable 
organization.60 
Britain's nationalism was not as associated with militarism as, for instance, Prussia's. The 
imperial prowess of Britain was oriented towards its economic dominance over much of 
the world, in contrast to belligerent success within the European theatre.61 However, 
coming to the twentieth century, its neighbours’ martial posturing had a detrimental 
influence on the general sense of national safety. The fact that Britain was simultaneously 
being forced to acknowledge the capabilities of other non-European powers as well, did 
nothing to put the public’s minds at rest either.62 The fuel which kept militarism on the 
surface during this time and sold itself to the masses were the values which it courted – 
the same values that were deeply imprinted into the minds of people through their social 
norms already. Militarism wasn’t a revolutionary ideology to suggest that enforcing 
militaristic virtues in culture and education would rebuild the backbone of the faltering 
and feminizing British nation, which had begun to be described by some as a ‘weary 
Titan, staggering under the too-vast orb of his fate.’63 Instead it was the ideology which 
felt just right at the time to answer to the growing doubts of national security, identity 
crises, and the nostalgia of days gone past. In this way, it got its foot in into the system in 
a way that let it not just reflect what people were already thinking, but manipulate it as 
well. Because of this cultural context, the ideas fostered about war upon its outbreak – 
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especially those by the younger recruits – were often highly glorified. The Great War 
represented a chance for them to redeem their place as men of ‘character’ in an age where 
opportunities for this were proving to be quite scarce despite of the emphasis on the 
importance of these qualities. 
When the country mobilized, Bertrand Russell, already then a public intellectual, 
discovered to his horror that ‘average men and women were delighted at the prospect of 
war.’64 Though the popular ideals had been shifting towards a more militarist nation, the 
initial reactions to an international war were still shocking to many influential members 
of Britain, who had not been mindful enough of the social undercurrents. On the surface, 
the working-class men cited ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ as their main reasons for joining, 
while the middle and upper classes repeated the words ‘honour’ and ‘sacrifice’ in their 
ethos reminiscent of that of medieval knights.65 The sense of duty for their country of the 
middle-class men was less pronounced and matter-of-fact than their working-class 
contemporaries. However, the very concept of noblesse oblige, which many of them 
adhered to as their reason for joining the war, holds within itself a sense of upper class 
obligation to pick up the arms and uphold the values which distinguish them from the rest 
of society. The idea which most prominently influenced the middle-class’ decision to go 
to war was that it was their duty to protect, and this sense of duty rose from the actions 
and rumoured actions of German soldiers when they invaded Belgium. The concept of 
war had not yet fit into Arthur Gibbs’ future plans when the talk of volunteering became 
relevant; he was soon to leave Europe, and was much more interested in the prospects of 
his personal career as a writer: 
England was at war. The Army would be buckling on its sword, running out its guns; the Navy clearing 
decks for action. It was their job, not mine … War, as such, was something which I had never considered 
as having any personal meaning for me.66 
What ultimately changed his mind was a discussion he had with a lady friend of his in a 
train coach, as he related the news of the fate of the Belgians coming across the channel 
to the potential fate of his valued friend and her family: 
But day by day the grey wave swept on, tearing down all veils from before the altar of reality. Belgian 
women were not merely bayoneted … Suppose I had returned to New York and the Germans had jumped 
the tiny Channel and "bayoneted" her and her children? Could I ever call myself a man again?67 
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Soon after this event he took a taxi to London and promptly drafted. His reaction is telling 
of the value structures and the following social pressure at place in the contemporary 
British society. Had Gibbs not stayed to fight, he would not have been viewed as less of 
a man only in his own eyes. According to Ute Frevert, ‘violating the honour of the 
enemy’s wives and daughters was not only an attack on husbands and fathers. It was 
meant and perceived to target and damage the honour of the whole nation.’68 The ‘rape 
of Belgium’ was thus a prime incentive for wartime collectivism among the middle-class, 
and provided them with the moral justification for battle, which would be useful for their 
psychological wellbeing later on when they had to partake in abhorrent duties of war 
themselves. 
However, many public-school volunteers had a diminished interest in the reasons of the 
war and saw it less as a duty and more as exactly the way to pursue their personal 
aspirations.69 Philip Blom has assessed the generation of middle-class youth before the 
outbreak of the Great War by stating that ‘never before had there been so much reason to 
be optimistic, and never before had people looked towards the future with stronger 
misgivings.’70 This generation wished to rebel against the status quo but had, at the same 
time, been fostered by nineteenth century establishments that equipped them with a value 
system that could not find its release in the cage of progressive thinking they had trapped 
themselves within. When the war broke out, these middle-class sons were less familiar 
and less interested with the political reasons behind the conflict, rather than what the idea 
of a righteous war represented for them.71 For this generation, war was a platform for 
absolution. The sentiments of this particular section of the population were best visualized 
by the quickly famous war poet and soldier Rupert Brooke, who proclaimed: ‘We who 
have known shame, we have found release there.’72 Volunteering for them was a way out 
without having to neither overhaul their values nor fall in line with the path laid out to 
them by their parents’ generation. Rupert Brooke understood this, and called out to other 
young men like him that they could join the war “as swimmers into cleanness leaping, 
glad from a world grown old and cold and weary.”73 He never wrote about his own 
experiences on the front in his poems, choosing to focus on the anticipation of the war 
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instead and encapsulating the fervent with which he and many of his middle-class peers 
entered the service. He would not live long enough to see this collective flame extinguish 
once many of Kitchener’s volunteers were finally able to admit that the War was not 
everything it was initially measured out to be, dying of food-poisoning in the trenches in 
1915.74  
When the fresh recruits moved from their homes to the army, they were met with a whole 
other world. The volunteers who poured in, whether as directly commissioned officers or 
as ‘rankers’, everyone had to go through similar training camps before being sent to the 
fronts. Arthur Gibbs recalled with humour how the last time a sergeant had called him a 
‘sir’ for a very long time was upon asking him to undress for inspection in the recruitment 
office he’d entered when he had decided to volunteer.75 It would take some soldiers time 
to adapt to the new hierarchical customs, which were just as rigid but not yet internalized 
like the social hierarchies which governed them in their civilian lives. These training 
centres organized the new soldiers into battalions and other units, and the training usually 
lasted a few months.76 Once there, many of the men found themselves conflicted: Along 
with the excitement that was present in many soldiers’ early letters home, one can detect 
a fair bit of disappointment as well at the state of affairs upon their arrival.  Arthur George 
Heath, who was teaching at Oxford before volunteering, wrote to his friend wryly of what 
he witnessed at the training camp when he as a freshly commissioned officer joined his 
regiment for the first time: 
This is a marsh by the Thames, intersected by canals, protected by a dyke that blocks the view of the river 
(though not of the sails on it), and covering a bog. No respectable cow would graze in such a place … You'd 
probably like to hear about the men. Well, they're not the 'flower of English manhood ' or, if they are, I pity 
the weeds.77 
It is not explicit what most men were expecting from the war prior to enlisting, but the 
many remarks Heath makes toward the disorganized nature of the camps and the other 
recruits indicates that he, like many others like him, had held some preconceived and 
maybe even idealistic notions about the army. Some sense of what the men were 
expecting can be deduced from their complaints, which ranged from the quality of the 
food served to a confusion about the lack of equipment. It is widely recognized that the 
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British army had not been prepared for the number of men who ended up volunteering, 
leading to many issues of logistics and supplies.78 This unsurprisingly disgruntled some 
of the middle-class men coming from a world of plenty, of whom many were away from 
their familiar surroundings and comforts for the first time in their lives. The initially 
reluctant volunteer Gibbs, for example, was very cross with the situation initially, as is 
evident of his recollection of his first breakfast at the training camp: 
We lined up before the door of a gun shed, hundreds of us, shivering, filing slowly in one by one and having 
a chunk of bread, a mug of tea and a tin of sardines slammed into our hands, the sardines having to be 
divided among four. The only man in my four who possessed a jack-knife to open the tin had cleaned his 
pipe with it, scraped the mud off his boots, cleaned out his nails and cut up plug tobacco. Handy things, 
jack-knives. He proceeded to hack open the tin and scoop out sardines. It was only my first morning and 
my stomach wasn't strong in those days. I disappeared into the mist, alone with my dry bread and tea. 
Hunger has taught me much since then.79 
The training of the British army during the Great War has been a widely contested topic, 
with many criticizing its inadequacy in the first years of war – though a rising number of 
historians have begun to emphasize the tactical developments from 1916 onwards.80 
However, not even in the later years after the training camp system had been reformed 
did the troops receive preparation on the camps that was representative of the real 
conditions in the trenches.81 Trying to replicate the conditions on the front would arguably 
not have even served the main function of the training camps, and at worst could have 
been detrimental towards their primary aim: To turn civilians into functioning soldiers at 
the most efficient pace possible. Despite of the outer appearances of the camps, they were 
not so much focused on teaching men to handle weapons and to make them as physically 
fit for war as possible; rather they were designed to disengage them from their civilian 
identities by all available means, and to start building their identities as soldiers.82 The 
army’s objective was not to completely erase their backgrounds, but to repurpose them to 
fit the military hierarchy and to inculcate the men into a world separate from the one they 
had left behind, where new customs dictated every aspect of their daily lives and where 
ethics followed different rules to those that applied at home. The most tangible reminder 
the soldiers received of their new identity were the serial numbers which, As the future 
sapper Alfred Henderson recalled, were ‘never to be forgotten,’ and were ‘in fact, more 
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important than one’s name.’83 With measures like these, the army had begun stripping the 
soldiers of their individuality in favour of their group. 
In enforcing the building of a uniform soldier identity in recruits, the most emphasized 
strategy for militaries is that of the assertion of the military hierarchical structures. All 
new soldiers in Kitchener’s Army had to adjust to the martial discipline as part of their 
basic training. For some, letting go of their civilian privileges was a bitter pill to swallow 
– a fact which was especially true for some of the middle-class recruits who had not been 
commissioned, and were instead drafted into the other ranks. At the same time, however, 
their background in the authoritarian public-school system and youth organizations had 
primed them well for the sort of discipline they were met with when they joined.84 Thus, 
the unyielding expectation of proper conduct could easily command respect, but it could 
also breed animosity, which was then swiftly weeded out by the establishment via coming 
down hard on soldiers who made critical mistakes. John Nettleton, who had become a 
member of The Artist Rifles, a unit particularly popular with public-school and university 
recruits, recounted an instance where a man was punished severely simply for blowing 
his nose while standing at attention, which he accepted as having been just one of the 
instances of arbitrary but crucial military conduct they now had to adopt.85 In an instance 
of similar ‘breaking in’ period, another officer trainee of ‘The Artists’ – Reginald Lester 
– wrote that he and his peers might have found themselves ‘given two hours of extra 
evening drill’ just for coming on parade ‘with one button less bright than the rest.’86 The 
reason for the necessity of following orders precisely and at all times was not yet apparent 
to them, but has always been a part of military training to condition the soldiers to follow 
orders without questioning the reasoning behind them. 
It was relatively easy for public-school educated middle-class men to receive commission 
as the need for officers grew as rapidly as the number of volunteers increased, but even 
those recruits who had become officers themselves could find this degree of disciplinary 
dogmatism difficult to adapt to.87 When Arthur G. Heath wrote home after spending a 
good deal of a week inspecting his platoon’s ‘feet and their boots and their rifles and their 
dinners and their invisible tooth brushes’ that he found military discipline ‘quite queer’ 
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and that he did not ‘altogether jump to it.’88 Meanwhile, subaltern Melhuish, while 
overseeing the early training of his men in Britain, wrote to his mother in Autumn 1914 
about the sympathy he felt towards his men as it began to dawn to them that the war would 
likely not meet their ideas of it: 
Now that the first rush of excitement is over lots of these people are beginning to find that life is not all 
music, their sense of personal comfort is greater than their patriotism, they are anxious to get away. They 
are not allowed to do so unless medically or physically unfit for service. They become sulky and 
insubordinate, and then there is trouble … I only hope none of my men do anything worthy of death.89 
The severity of the punishments was another reason for dismay of the fresh recruits, and 
often took them by surprise. Individual reactions to the army during this introductory 
phase ranged from outright hostility to deferential acceptance. In the end, however, those 
who made it through the training camps had adopted their second identity, motivated to 
go out there and fight the ‘Hun’ as members of the wider military organization. In the 
divisions formed out of Kitchener’s volunteers, where no one received adequate 
preparation for what was to come, the other ranks ultimately shared the desire of their 
equally untrained officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) to equip themselves 
as quickly as possible for active service. This solidarity and the idealism which had not 
yet been tampered with by the realities of war motivated both sides, enabling most units 
to complete their basic training much sooner than expected, considering the many 
practical obstacles standing in their way.90 
Once the soldiers had been shipped to the front, their attitudes towards the military 
organization diverged greatly between the officers and NCOs who they shared the 
battlefields with, and the higher ranks who were largely absent from the front. Those who 
served with them in the same unforgiving conditions were regarded very differently from 
the other military organization representatives, hence the officers and NCOs will be 
covered in the next chapter with the rest of those who soldiers considered their ‘brothers 
in arms’. What comes to the more distant commanders, the interpretations of historians 
have fallen in somewhere between perceived resentment and adoration felt by the soldiers 
towards their high command. Like most other topics covered in this study, the sources 
provide proof for both sides of the argument, and the side historians have chosen is 
indicative of which tradition of Great War histories they follow; the traditional narrative 
or the revisionist school. The historians of the traditional British narrative which built 
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upon figures such as Liddel Hart and A.J.P Taylor are often very unkind to Field Marshall 
Haig and other contemporary military commanders. These two were the pioneers of the 
traditional narrative of the Great War, and in their wake the sources have been interpreted 
so that the soldiers often seem quite cynical of their command. Such interpretations of the 
high command’s professionality and the subsequent attitudes of the troops have since 
challenged by modern military historians such as Gary Sheffield and John Terraine, who 
both highlight the rationality with which the BEF was led considering the circumstances, 
and the loyalty which prevailed in the British troops during the war despite of the 
hardships they had to endure.91 
The differences between letters and diaries versus memoirs as source material become 
particularly relevant when addressing this question: One can find much more criticism 
for the decisions of the high command in war memoirs written during the interwar and 
Cold War years – both periods during which pacifist views were prevalent. Furthermore, 
even if the negative retrospective attitudes weren’t ideologically driven, they likely 
partially resulted from the fact that the way the soldiers interpreted their own experiences 
later was influenced and informed by the subsequent attempts made by some to make 
certain figures into the primary scapegoats of the horrors of the war. Michael Roper has 
pointed out that the post-war mood of bitter disaffection was pronounced among soldiers 
who were in their late teens and early twenties and unmarried during the war; those 
members of the so called ‘war generation’ who has known little or no adult existence 
other than as soldiers.92  Historian Edgar Jones also believes that a part of the post-war 
attitudes of some veterans was due to the dissonance between expectations and ideals that 
had led them to the recruitment office, and the actual realities of wartime service.93 As 
such, the letters and diaries that date back to the wartime are much more reliable accounts 
of contemporary soldiers’ feelings towards their high command. What stands out from 
these sources is that any ranks higher than the officers’ present on the front are scarcely 
mentioned. An explanation to this could be found in the wisdom of a career officer 
Feilding’s remark after being asked on leave what the serving men thought of Haig; to 
which he replied that ‘you might as well have asked the private soldier what he thinks of 
God. He knows about the same amount on each.’94 Ironically, the attitudes towards the 
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higher ups in the military often had worshipping features to them, such as when Bernard 
Martin, who had been one of the middle-class men enthusiastically joining the ‘righteous 
war’ at the age of seventeen recalled in his encounter with Haig after Somme that his 
opportunity to salute ‘the C in C was the finale of a large experience.’95 This is telling of 
the sense of trust most soldiers ultimately felt during the war towards the organization 
that sustained them and helped them endure the burdens of war. 
The dilemma at the outbreak of the Great War from the military establishment perspective 
was how to transform recruits into ‘sharp fighting machines’ with the strength of character 
to overcome the carnage inflicted by the industrial arms.96 At the time, the understanding 
of human psyche wasn't so developed, but the military system had had thousands of years 
to accumulate silent knowledge that helped create conditions where soldiers became more 
compliant to the strenuous tasks laid ahead of them than they would otherwise be. There 
are many implicit ways to make killing and enduring the threat of dying easier, and while 
some were left for the soldiers themselves to figure out, some received help from the 
military organization either knowingly or without. Whatever awareness of psychology 
the British army had during the war was often understood as distinctive aspects of morale, 
which is subsequently evident from the language used in both military training manuals, 
and in statements commenting on the endurance of men on the field. Staff officers were 
divided between those who had an optimistic outlook and believed that with right training 
the troops would reach the necessary high morale, and those who argued that the way to 
victory lied not in trusting the character of the soldiers, but rather in the development of 
more powerful weapons than the enemy.97 Both camps nevertheless had to come together 
to create training suitable for the modern conditions of war, and the preparation of the 
British army during the Great War was divided into three areas of focus to produce the 
desired results: These areas were: (1) cohesion training, (2) combat preparation, and (3) 
mental preparation.98 Their respective main purpose was to ensure unity of action, 
produce a predictable response, and to counter fear. 
The purpose of cohesion training is to enforce the mechanisms of obedience to authority 
and group absolution. Known sometimes as esprit de corps in military context, this type 
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of cohesion is meant to inspire enthusiasm, devotion, and strong regard for the honor of 
the group, and it is still the focus of nearly all modern militaries.99 Upon joining the army, 
the moral perquisite was that each man would followingly put all individual priorities, 
even survival instinct, second to the goals of the military organization. To normalize such 
behavior within the organization, the British army endeavored to socialize men into a 
specific soldierly culture of obedience and group loyalty. In such an environment, 
dissension became unpalatable: troops were tirelessly drilled to habituate them to obey 
orders without delay and to make them adjust to their new soldier identity.100 Those who 
did not conform were punished both with official punitive measures as per the vertical 
structure of the military hierarchy, but also socially in the horizontal sphere inhabited by 
their fellow troops: The knowledge that each one of them was in the same boat ensured 
that they would be vigilant of one another, lest they risk their own survival in the line. At 
the same time, conduct that reached even the minimum levels of compliance was 
rewarded by both the system with material and symbolic gestures, and by one’s fellow 
soldiers through approval.101 Sometimes cohesion would not hold under severe conditions 
in the frontlines, but often what would happen was that when they were forced to face 
extreme circumstances, the experience strengthened the troops defensive motivations for 
joining the army in the first place, which resulted in an even deeper identification with 
the system.102 This was the best case scenario to come out of cohesion training from the 
military organization perspective, as the deeper the identification felt with the system was, 
the likelier too was that they would not break from the strategies which, from the high 
command point of view, governed the overall course of the war. 
Combat preparation aimed to familiarize soldiers with both the tools of their trade, and 
the conditions which they were going to be faced with in actual combat. The objective of 
this training was to familiarize the troops with military conduct to the extent that their 
actions would become automated. Ceaseless drilling was employed to make sure that 
soldiers would be able to carry through their tasks without actively having to think of 
what they were doing. This type of training aimed to inhibit the cognitive processes that 
may become detrimental to the completion of missions through the need for active 
defense and coping mechanisms.103 Modern military psychologists still enforce these 
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types of ‘ritualized’ drilling practices to enhance combat performance.104 Combat 
preparation focused on affecting the behavior of soldiers through conditioning their 
responses through repetitive training, which was then enforced with both punitive and 
rewarding measures. Like all military training, combat preparation also relied highly on 
enabling soldiers to outsource their ethics and decision making through obedience to 
authority. Out of all three training focus areas, combat preparation transformed the most 
over the course of the war, continually adapting to the changing circumstances on the 
front: For instance, extreme ‘realism training’ which was tested at the beginning stages 
of war, was quickly abandoned after it was found to cause trauma in and of itself rather 
than preventing it.105 Meanwhile bayonet training, which was heavily enforced in the 
British military before and in the beginning of the war, retained its position as a focal 
point in combat preparation training throughout the war despite of how rarely soldiers on 
the front ended up using the weapon for its intended purpose. Bayonet training also works 
as an example of training which on the outside may have seemed cut and dry combat 
preparation training, yet had a more profound motive for existing in how it was thought 
to prime the soldiers spirit for the tasks that lay ahead. 
The mental preparation given to soldiers prior to being sent to combat aimed to provide 
them with as much information as possible to keep them functional in the moment’s 
confusion also known as the ‘fog of war’, while simultaneously withholding from them 
any contradictory information that might jeopardize their rationalization and acceptance 
process that enables them to take part in their primary duty.106 This training is focused on 
enforcing morale through affirmations of the righteousness of the army’s cause: Some of 
the strategies include persuading the soldiers through organizationally enforcing the 
process of enmification, or appealing to their religious feelings. Despite of how 
rudimentary the understanding of psychology before the Great War may seem when 
viewed through current standards, the military establishment was already concerning 
itself with optimizing the soldiers’ mental state for the conditions of war when it broke 
out. This focus area gained even more attention as the war went on and it became apparent 
how large the threat of psychiatric casualties was. Until the Vietnam War, late onset 
combat stress reactions were hardly mentioned, but each such casualty not only deprived 
the battlefield of an otherwise functional soldier, but the cost of traumatized veterans on 
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society would continue to be considerable even after the war had ended.107 The increase 
in firepower and the expectation of heavy casualties in attacking troops led to staff 
officers emphasizing the need for an offensive mentality. This resulted in training which 
best ensured the willingness of soldiers to throw their lives away for their cause were 
given a pre-eminent role in what was called the ‘psychological battlefield’.108 
Not all training practices worked as intended, or at least they have since garnered a lot of 
heat. The bayonet emphasis within the British military training has been analyzed so 
much by the Great War historians that it has become a cliché, but it is one of the prime 
samples of how the Great War worked as a divider between the old world and the new. 
For the British army, the bayonet was first and foremost a symbol of their military ideals. 
A majority of the British high command agreed on the necessity of inciting aggression 
for the enemy in the troops, and hence the bayonet training was enforced not so much for 
its utility, but to ‘arouse the pugnacity of the men.’109 The capacity to fight at close 
quarters was also used as a propaganda measure of the excellence and courage of the 
British troops in comparison to their German counterparts. By the Great War, however, 
edged-weapon combat had almost disappeared, and John Keegan notes that in the Battle 
of the Somme ‘edged-weapon wounds were a fraction of one per cent of all wounds 
inflicted.’110 Overall, bayonets and other edged close-combat weapons accounted only 
half a percent of wounds in the German and British armies, to which the high command 
did on occasion admit that however strong the logic for the spirit of the bayonet, it was 
no easy matter to convert its theory into practice on the battlefield. C.P. Blacker, who 
served as an infantry officer and was later awarded the Military Cross, remarked that 
while it was ‘splendid that our forceful corps commander should tell us that the real 
business of war was done with the bayonet … [bayonets] would not stop autumn rains or 
dry up the waterlogged crater-fields.’111 Tim Travers, who has studied British military 
history extensively, has argued that the fixation on bayonets reflected the reluctance of 
the army to adapt to new conditions, which in turn ‘lay the anxiety of a profession whose 
political and social standing was threatened by the obsolescence of those qualities that 
had served to gain respect and justification in the past.'112 If modern war was defined more 
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by firepower than the soldiers’ ‘character’, then the military organization as it had existed 
until then had become obsolete. 
By contrast, where the British army training absolutely succeeded was in the adaptation 
and implementation of Britain’s civilian social structures within the military hierarchy. 
Gary Sheffield has argued that the way the paternalism-deference exchange, which 
regulated pre-war class interaction, was transferred to the officer-man relationship in the 
army created strongly cohesive inter-rank relations.113 Deference was one of the principal 
bonds of the contemporary British society: It was both a pragmatic response of working-
class men to economic realities, and a ‘natural’ way of life for both sides through cultural 
internalization by the way of religion and education. Deference was not a relationship of 
subservience, but viewed as ‘the natural exchange’ for paternalism, which meant that 
officers who did not look after their men forfeited their commissioned status in the eyes 
of the men.114 The middle-class officers were acutely aware of this, and Donald Hankey 
stated that ‘the average officer sets a high standard both for his men and for himself’ and 
that ‘he seldom fails to secure their loyal co-operation in attaining to it’.115 Most historians 
are in broad agreement that this adaptation of wider social structures into the army in 
1914–18 provided a bedrock of social cohesion which prevented the BEF from 
collapse.116 Alexander Watson’s assessment is that the acceptance of the army’s authority 
as legitimate had roots in the soldiers’ attachment to their civilian roles and loyalties in 
the Great War.117 The decision to uphold the British tradition of the gentleman officer 
even as the number of officers was too few and their training into the role often took 
months to accomplish was not borne simply out of elitist sensibilities of who was a natural 
fit for the job; instead upper and middle-class officers were preferred precisely because 
their background and education provided them with the crucial leadership skills. Gary 
Sheffield has stated that ‘chivalric influences ingested via the public school, pulpit and 
sports-field’ left the young middle-class men with little doubt of the standards expected 
of officers in command of men who were put in a position to potentially sacrifice their 
lives for their country.118 
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Eventually, when the death toll of the war forced the British army to alter some of its 
practices, it still did not completely let go of the ideal of the gentleman officer. The army 
awarded more than two hundred thousand new commissions during the conflict, and by 
the end of the war as much as thirty-nine percent of officers came from the lower middle 
and working classes.119 The reason for this was purely pragmatic, as Britain had a limited 
amount of upper and middle-class recruits to offer for officer positions. However, over 
the course of the war they enriched their training to accommodate these officers and 
NCOs who lacked the civilian background upon which the institution was built on, 
adjusting it so that the lower-class officers could be fully imbued with the traditional 
values of paternalism and leadership.120 The dedication for following this ‘natural order 
of things’ in the British military dates back centuries, and a regimental history written just 
forty years before the war had suggested that ‘the soldier in the hour of need and danger 
will ever be more ready to follow the officer and gentleman whom education, position in 
life, and accident of birth point out to be his natural leader.’121 Whether there is truth to 
this statement or not, the British army’s hierarchical structures provided the Great War 
soldiers with solid rules of conduct which gave their lives in the trenches a rhythm and 
took away personal responsibility when executing their tasks of war. It shaped their war 
experience by providing them with ideological support and a larger entity within which 
they could contextualize their personal experiences. It also enabled the camaraderie of 
brothers in arms to flourish, which has been recounted by many veterans to have been 
their primary motivation and relief in the otherwise chaotic and devastating war, and will 
be the focus of the next chapter. 
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2.2. The Brothers is Arms 
T. H. Procter, as he was studying the morale of soldiers in 1920, observed that ‘one did 
not love the army’, but that it was possible to love the battalion or even the regiment and 
identify oneself with its purposes, consequently also feeling proud of its achievements 
and ashamed were it broken.122 Further than that, the relationships the soldiers formed in 
their most basic units of platoon and section count among some of the strongest they ever 
formed, sometimes surpassing even their closest civilian relationships. ‘Of my memories 
of life in the trenches, the one thing I cherish more than anything else is the comradeship 
that grew up between us,’ said George Coppard while recounting his experiences in the 
war which he had joined underage as a sixteen year old private, ‘living together under the 
open sky, night and day, fair weather or foul, witnessing death or injury, helping in 
matters of urgency, and above all, facing the enemy’ created circumstances which formed 
the solid foundation on which their comradeship was built.’123 Richard Holmes has stated 
that in the Great War, there was no single British army, but ‘a collection of regiments, 
drawn together in loose association into brigades and divisions which had personalities 
of their own.’124 A soldier’s unit members became his family during the war, and his 
world was defined by the unit’s culture: It set borders on his life on duty and out of it, 
dictated whether he got promotions or leaves, guided his interpersonal relationships, and 
determined the strictness of the discipline which ruled him.125 More than any decisions 
made by the higher ups, a Great War soldier’s war experience was determined by how he 
related to his unit members on the battlefield: Even without the numerous modern 
psychological studies that underline the importance of an individual’s social context to 
their mental state and subsequent behavior, this is reflected in both how much of an 
emphasis soldiers put in their writings on the camaraderie (or the lack thereof) they 
experienced, and how integral group dynamics are to the field of military psychology to 
this day. 
Sidney Rogerson, who was commissioned in 1914 and went on to write about the 
diversity of the emotional experience in the trenches after the war was over, observed that 
as ‘terrifying and uncomfortable they often were, the war years will stand out in the 
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memory of vast numbers who fought as the happiest period of their lives’ as he and his 
comrades were ‘privileged to see in each other that inner, ennobled self which in the grim, 
commercial struggle of peacetime is all too frequently atrophied for lack of 
opportunity.’126 His observation speaks of the contemporary British context and the 
restrictions of the society which fostered these men: In the war, they could finally form 
relationships which were built on the ‘true’ nature of their character, rather than the 
projection of it through attained social status. As social creatures, humans identify 
themselves through the groups in which they belong to, and we have consequently 
developed many psychological mechanisms around enforcing primary group creation and 
cohesion. The ethnologist Konrad Lorenz has said that a ‘man is not a killer, but the group 
is’ – and as will be seen in following chapters, the effect of his group was integral to how 
a soldier reacted in combat situations.127 In a group, humans begin to act as a crowd, and 
the crowd has an intensifying effect: If aggression exists, it will become more so; if joy 
exists, it will become intensified by the crowd.128 As such, the effect of the crowd seems 
to be much like a mirror, reflecting each individual's behavior in those around him and 
thus intensifying the existing pattern of behavior.129 The internalization of a group’s 
ideology and motives occurs when a norm's 'maintenance has become independent of its 
external outcomes, and the behaviors that are dictated by social norms become the ends 
that individuals desire in and of itself, and there is no discrepancy between the interests 
of the individual and those of the group.’130  As was previously seen, the British military 
organization was geared towards producing this exact result. 
However, the importance of social context began before the men had even joined the 
military. The middle-class volunteers of Kitchener’s army had been as tightly knitted in 
their surrounding culture as they were in the war before they had even stepped a foot in a 
recruitment centre. The social context from whence they came from had provided them 
with values to uphold and ideals to strive for much like their brothers in arms would later 
provide them with a motivation to carry on despite of how dire the circumstances were. 
However, while the trench environment would prove to be fairly straightforward what 
comes to social dynamics, the progress that had been occurring during the beginning of 
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the twentieth century before 1914 was a double-edged sword for British middle-class 
men: While the outer trappings of life were improving and life was made easier and more 
pleasant to live, it was making the unique qualities of men obsolete. Less wars, heavy 
machinery, and working opportunities for women were all undermining the importance 
of a man’s role in his community.131 Feminism was on the rise in Britain before the war, 
and while campaigning for the rights of women, this ideological base also brought to 
question the traditionalist views about men as well. In 1905, a feminist writer Rosa 
Mayreder had articulated the conundrum of modern men’s identities like so: 
Even the work of a man has been replaced by the machine. The machine worker is a mere executor of a 
particular movement, which could just as well be done by women and children … The ‘strong fist’ which 
under other conditions was crucial and formed the legal foundation of his dominion, has become entirely 
superfluous … The office, the workplace, the professional practice, the atelier—they are all coffins of 
masculinity.132 
Man, as a warrior, was simply no longer needed in modern society, in which even manual 
labour often required little physical prowess, yet men were still required to adhere to an 
ideal they could no longer fulfill.133 It is no wonder then, that when an opportunity finally 
arrived for men to prove their worth as men, as warriors on the battlefield, some greeted 
the Great War with zest. Sholto Douglas, for example, wrote later how the declaration of 
war and the mere mention of patriotism caused a ‘quickening of the pulse’ and that he 
‘had no hesitation about deciding as soon as war was declared’ about what he was going 
to do.134 He began as a commissioned infantry officer, but would later go on to join the 
Royal Flying Corps, a position which was statistically even more dangerous than the 
infantry, but also promised more glory to the survivors. 
Social relations between individuals within homogenous groups draw heavily from the 
group’s shared values. For the contemporary British middle-class men, the quality ‘most 
valued of Victorian possessions’ was the virtue of good character.135 The concept of 
‘character’ can be translated to mean an identity which successfully reflected the most 
significant of the middle-class values at the time, masculinity and honour.136 Values held 
different meanings for the classes, and for the middle-class, these qualities were not 
regarded as a given, but something that had to be acquired and upheld.137 The concept of 
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‘character’ is near interchangeable with the concept of ‘masculinity’, as both could be 
defined as a set of features complementary to each other; such as ‘courage’, ‘self-
sacrifice’, and ‘duty’.138 The dominant ideal of masculinity, deriving from the militaristic 
atmosphere of the age, defined the man by soldierly qualities of mind and body.139 Along 
with masculinity, middle-class character also relied on the concept of honour: When the 
former became increasingly difficult to manifest in modern society, honour, which was 
primarily witnessed through acts of masculine virtue, experienced a crisis as well. 
Sociologically speaking, honour served as a means of social integration; it established 
certain rules for behaviour within a social group and provided its members with means to 
solve their conflicts in a way that did not damage the community’s inner harmony. 
Honour was inseparably linked to assertive practices; aggressive action was often 
required to maintain one’s honour, even at the threat of a loss of life or limb.140 
Accordingly, honour culture was particularly pronounced in the inherently masculine 
military, since what would have been a more obvious place to look for honour, than the 
battlefield?141 
Sociological research has placed a great emphasis on the importance of the ‘primary 
groups’ for armies’ cohesion and combat efficiency, yet Great War historians diverge in 
how much of an emphasis they place on the camaraderie experienced by the men.142 
While the sources reveal that the soldiers’ feelings towards their fellow men weren’t 
always benevolent and that shirking duties – or sometimes even stealing – was a common 
menace, a part of the complaints could be read as being the soldiers’ way of venting in 
their diaries or to their loved ones.143 The incidents of animosity between unit members 
could even counter-intuitively be viewed as an indicator of the level of intimacy that these 
men shared. Despite easily appearing hostile to an outsider, their surface-level actions 
could have simply been the effects of stress manifesting in the mutual relationships 
between the troops and helping them all remain sane. Coppard described these intense 
and often turbulent relationships the men in his unit shared with one another: 
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We would often quarrel violently over nothing. We would rage over little things. Our life was dominated 
by small, immediate events. Bad weather and long working hours would provoke outbursts of grumbling. 
A sunny morning and the prospect of a holiday would make us exuberantly cheerful and some would declare 
that the army was not so bad after all.144 
The lives of these middle-class men had turned upside down as they were stripped of their 
freedom and made to work long hours in extreme conditions; and not only that, but they 
were also asked to do all of this while having to partake in some of the most traumatic 
duties of war. It is little wonder then that their emotions would manifest in exaggerated 
forms whenever allowed, for as long as they had not become numbed and desensitizied 
by their prolonged experiences on the front. 
Most men were acutely aware of the shared ethos which propelled the troops, and what 
reservoirs of mental fortitude their units could be.145 The group helped each member carry 
the guilt of killing, allowed them to air out their frustration and gallows humour which 
eased the unspoken shared fear and co-dependence, and reassured them of their role by 
everyone conforming to the same ‘lunacy’ that they themselves had chosen to partake in. 
Richard Williams, who wrote many letters during the war to his family before he was 
killed in action in 1917, confided in them that ‘it is only the spirit of brotherliness and 
mutual helpfulness’ that made ‘the thing bearable.’146 Psychologist S. J. Rachman has 
argued for the inhibitive effect on fear of social relations on the battlefield, stating that 
the presence of another person increases the perceived possibility of control over the 
situation.147 In the same vein Charles Bird, a contemporary American psychologist 
studying British troops at the time, observed that men ‘seek the protection of comrades 
by sinking their personality into the fighting unit’ at times of danger.148 Within the 
trenches, however, there existed two markedly different types of relationships with 
separate functions: The relationships between members of two distinct levels of the 
hierarchy, and the relationships between peers. 
While still on the training camp, an officer of the BEF was a man strictly apart from his 
men and never seen without both sides adhering to proper military conduct.149 In the 
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frontline, however, things changed as the outer trappings of military hierarchy gave way 
for survival tactics, and a competent officer was turned into an involved leader, constantly 
checking on his men and their munitions. Theodore Hardy, already a seasoned padre by 
the time the war broke out, observed from his observational post as a military chaplain 
that ‘the line is the key to the whole thing. Work in the front line and they will listen to 
you. If you stay back, you are wasting your time. Men will forgive anything but lack of 
courage and devotion.’150 On the battlefield, officers provided a sense of order, 
empowerment, and safety – three things desperately sought out in situations where 
soldiers felt they were losing control or questioned the things they were partaking in.151 
A strong officer could erase doubts from the minds of his soldiers to the extent that they 
would be less likely to question the decisions made by their unit later out of sheer respect. 
Meanwhile, officers devoid of military skill were distrusted by their subordinates.152 
Similarly, Rachman has found that effective, calm leaders make ‘important contributions’ 
to the control of fear – the primary emotion associated with the strain of war.153 
Donald Hankey had come from a wealthy family and quickly rose to sergeant after joining 
Kitchener’s army as a gentleman ranker – likely due to his interest in the working-class 
people. While he was still a Private, he described in his memoirs the utmost appreciation 
and respect he and his unit came to feel towards their captain as a result of him 
continuously exhibiting the virtues of humility, optimism, and patience in regard to his 
men: 
We began to take almost as much interest and pride in his progress as he did in ours. We were his men, and 
he was our leader. We felt that he was a credit to us, and we resolved to be a credit to him.154 
Trust in one’s commander is still recognized by military psychology as the most important 
factor of sense of security in a unit.155 Officers would earn good relationships with their 
men through showing paternalistic affection in periods of inactivity in the trenches, and 
firm military excellence in times of battle.156 Soldiers who knew that an officer cared for 
their wellbeing would also trust him not to throw their lives away needlessly in battle. As 
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the psychiatrist Edward Mapother observed when he studied the soldier responses in the 
Great War during the interwar years, ‘neurosis was rarest in units whose officers showed 
real interest in securing for their men any possible comfort or mitigation of hardship and 
when out of the line knew how to insist on discipline and fitness without annoying men 
about eyewash.’157 In the investigation into shell shock that was conducted after the war 
was over, the effect of good leadership found that the presence of ‘good officers, 
especially as regards leadership and care of their men’ is a key factor protecting soldiers 
from psychiatric disease.158 According to psychiatrists Roy R. Grinker and John P. 
Spiegel, men had to be lavished with fatherly affection if they were to prove effective in 
combat.159 The ‘father’ had to be competent, strong, and decisive so that his men would 
feel protected; he had to demonstrate good judgement and to be a ‘just and impartial 
father’, rewarding and punishing men accordingly.160 
The officer too, drew strength from this responsibility and trust placed on him. A theme 
that runs through many wartime officers’ letters, diaries, and memoirs is that of devotion 
for their men.161 Officer Ian Campbell recalled that back in the billets he would hate his 
subordinate men with their stubborn moods and continually bad language, but that during 
difficult times they would ‘show up splendidly.’162 His note regarding the use of language 
is a reoccurring theme in many middle-class accounts, as they were forced to mingle with 
the working class. The prevalent tone in these mentions indicates that one’s manner of 
speech was a conscious way to establish and enforce this separation. Arthur Gibbs even 
wrote down how his profanity habits transitioned as he worked his way up in the 
hierarchy: 
It's odd about that language habit. While in the ranks I never caught it, perhaps because I considered myself 
a bit above that sort of thing. It was so childish and unsatisfying. But since I have been an officer I think I 
could sometimes have almost challenged the sergeant-major!163 
For the historian as well, in the absence of details about their life, the language that the 
soldiers used in their letters and diaries is the most tangible indicator of their social 
background. Paul Fussel has studied the soldiers’ letters and diaries from a literary 
perspective, and points out that not only were the soldiers’ accounts rife with clichés made 
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familiar to them through the literature they consumed as boys and as young men in their 
free time and in school, but that the way they approach the narrative writing of their own 
stories owes itself to what they deemed to be a palatable way to write about their 
experiences.164 By being able to distinguish himself through rank, proper speech became 
less important for Gibbs. 
The hierarchical attitude between ranks was seen as instrumental in establishing a 
functional relationship between the officers and their men within the military 
organization, yet many officers also believed that it was their duty to protect ‘their’ men 
against what many perceived as an impersonal and arbitrary war machine.165 Some even 
refused to attack in unfavorable circumstances; such as one officer who invoked the 200 
hundred men of his regiment who were presumably sick at the eve of the Battle of Loos.166 
Not everyone was happy about their place in the hierarchy either, with middle-class 
rankers having been slightly more inclined to complain about the officer-man relationship 
than their working-class counterparts.167  They were not used to assuming the deferential 
position to men who in other circumstances they would have considered their peers.168 
This effect was highlighted in the instances where accomplished working-class men 
eventually rose to the rank of an officer, evident in how John Tucker, himself a public-
school educated middle-class ranker, described the regard towards these men: 
It is curious that many of us suffered from the old-fashioned prejudice regarding officers who were not 
drawn from the upper echelon of society or without public school education, I remember one young 
subaltern, a former bank clerk with a slight cockney accent, who was looked down on by the lower ranks – 
a case of inverted snobbery?
169
 
As previously shown, the British army made use of and was very complementary to the 
larger class system, with officers coming mostly from the middle class and above. At 
home, these young men had grown in relative privilege and freedom, but the army was a 
place for neither – even if they had acquired a commission. Becoming an officer without 
transitionary ranker period was quite easy for a person of a public-school background. 
However, some middle-class men however chose to draft in the other ranks instead either 
out of eagerness to see action, or self-doubt in their own leadership capabilities.170 Arthur 
                                                          
164 Fussell 2009, 199. 
165 Cecil & Liddle 2003, 416. 
166 Travers 2009, 21. History apparently ‘does not tell’ what consequences the officer faces after his insubordination. 
167 Cecil & Liddle 2003, 419. 
168 ibid., 419. 
169 Tucker 2015, 41. 
170 Ferguson 2003, 199. 
37 
 
Gibbs, who did eventually end up rising the hierarchical ladder once he found his 
confidence, recalled how he felt in the beginning of his service: 
As an officer I shouldn't have known what to do with the mob of which I was one. I should have been 
awkward, embarrassed. It didn't occur to me then that there were hundreds, thousands, who knew as little 
as we did about the Army, who were learning to be second lieutenants as we were learning to be troopers.171 
The expectations placed upon officers were great, and like Gibbs, many were hesitant of 
taking up the task out of fear of losing their face, their decisions guided by their civilian 
identities’ concerns about social status, which could be very easily marred if they failed 
their duties as an officer. 
Homogenous groups through a common social background, age, and ethnicity have been 
found by military research to make for better unit cohesion.172 Through sharing common 
values, the cohesion of a culturally homogenous group was heightened; so were 
consequently the effects of peer pressure and group absolution, which have been 
hypothesized to be the primary reason anything gets done in a battle situation. Among 
groups of men who have strong unit cohesion, there is a powerful process of peer pressure 
in which the individual would rather die than let his comrades down; both out of genuine 
attachment, and the fear of what others members of the group might think of him if he 
failed.173 Unit cohesion has even been found by modern psychological research to predict 
combat effectiveness better than combat intensity.174 Research on soldiers has also found 
that members of units with good unit cohesion were less likely than other soldiers to suffer 
breakdown, and good company morale also appeared to protect soldiers from mental 
collapse.175 The organizationally enforced cohesion within the context of the middle-class 
volunteers of Kitchener’s army relied heavily on the values which belonged in the social 
context of their civilian selves. The heightened willingness to volunteer among the 
middle-class also likely had its roots in the primary values of their shared culture, which 
thereafter translated well into the military context. 
More than third of Kitchener’s army battalions were so called ‘Pal’s battalions’, raised 
by associations in towns and cities, whose inhabitants paid for their training, equipment, 
and uniforms.176 Some of these battalions were composed of already established friends 
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committed to serving together, but not everyone was so lucky.177 The ways in which the 
recruits without ready friends began trying to cope with their environment after leaving 
their home behind often involved attempting to find like-minded company; a feature 
which among the middle-class culminated in exchanging experiences within the public-
school system. The military and the training camps were rigged to treat them not as 
individuals, but as cogwheels in the larger war machine, disposable and replaceable. As 
a reaction to this, conscious or not, the soldiers would find ways to remind themselves of 
their unique identity through forming intimate bonds with their comrades. Platoon and 
section fall within the natural perimeters of an intimate human group, and in these units, 
men were often going on first-name basis. 178 Of the small units of the army, John Priestley 
wrote that ‘unless luck was running hard against you, one of them would be your sort, a 
man you could call a friend, often pure gold.’179 He had been an aspiring writer when he 
volunteered in 1914, but would later in life only occasionally touch upon his war 
experiences, focusing especially on the camaraderie he had felt towards some of his 
brothers in arms in the trenches. Because this sort of bonding between the men enforces 
good unit cohesion, it has been and is still actively facilitated by armies through enforcing 
soldiers to bond with each other through recreational events outside of combat, and it is 
exactly the reason why frequent sanctioned alcohol related events, which were tolerated 
in the Great War, are still perpetuated by modern militaries.180 
The way with which divisions built up distinctive identities displays the natural 
inclination that humans have towards forging group identities which foster primary group 
cohesion. These divisional identities embodied a concoction of differing qualities; 
regional bonding, a blend of regimental friendships and rivalries, a pride in past 
performance (real or imagined), and confidence (or disdain) in the divisional commander 
and his staff.181 Though the largest units meant little to the soldiers as far as their social 
spheres were concerned, the old traditions which tied the institution together were 
regarded with awe. Hankey described the assimilation of regimental culture from the 
middle-class soldier’s perspective like so: 
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He has given up his personal freedom, which was not really of much use to him, and in return he has 
received what is infinitely more precious — his share of the common heritage of the regiment, its glorious 
past, its present prowess, its honour and good name, its high resolves.182 
The middle-class men who were first to volunteer would have been well-educated into 
the historical significance of the British army institution, and through getting to taste some 
of the most traditional aspects of this institution, they were quick to adopt the values 
which it stood for and to attempt to integrate themselves within its ranks. One way in 
which this is visible is how quickly they took over the old military jargon, turning 
‘recruits’ into ‘Tug Wilsons’, ‘slips of paper’ into ‘chit’, and ‘rifles’ into ‘bundhooks’.183 
This kind of privileging of group over individual already had its roots in the British culture 
prior to the ignition of the war: The moral system was woven into the identities of the 
middle-class soldiers by the public schools involved a heavy emphasis on individual 
submission to group loyalty. The rhetoric which emphasized masculinity inevitably relied 
upon group identification, and this framework of attitudes about manliness and loyalty to 
higher institutions found its culmination in the war.184 
‘There is no life more intimate than that of the barrack-room,’ recounted Donald Hankey 
after the war, and that ‘there is no life where the essential characters of men are so fully 
revealed as the life of the trench.’185 The intimacy of brothers in arms was manifested 
both physically and psychologically, of which the physical presence shared by the man 
was equally if not more important than the psychological bond. Lord Moran, who worked 
as a medical officer during the war and later became acclaimed for his acute observations 
of the soldiers’ experience, observed during the war that ‘physical contact is the one thing 
that helps’ the soldiers against fear.186 The Psychiatrist S.L.A. Marshall similarly 
encouraged men after the Second World War to provide each other with friendly physical 
contact, arguing that human warmth – or merely being able to see another man – was 
essential to offensives.187 Proximity allowed the easing of tension through conversation, 
while shared songs indirectly expressed the soldiers’ common and otherwise unspoken 
fears. It also guarded men from mental collapse, as men who were left ‘too long in any 
lonely position or in a lonely nature of employment’ were recalled by veterans later to 
have been particularly prone to mental collapse.188 The reason for this might have been 
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that they lacked the certainty and sense of control which the company of trusted comrades 
could provide.189 This trust is considered essential to a soldier’s effectiveness in battle by 
modern militaries: As long as the soldier can trust that his commander and unit are leading 
him to survival, he can feel secure in his dependency. But when this trust fails, the soldier 
becomes susceptible to anxiety and anger.190 Marshall concluded in his post Second 
World War study that he holds ‘it to be one of the simplest truths of war that the thing 
which enables an infantry soldier to keep going with his weapons is the near presence or 
the presumed presence of a comrade.’191 The group allowed a sense of purpose upon days 
and years which seemed to otherwise be featureless and endless. In the end, collective 
personality became so pervasive that men on leave sometimes felt like deserters, would 
eat meals for dead comrades, internalize the values of dead comrades and become reticent 
about their private lives, so as not to weaken the bond.192 
For any group to achieve a strong group identity, they need an out-group to their in-
group.193 In war, this is relatively easy to achieve and enforce through enforced 
enmification, which in the Great War had begun in Britain as an ideological message of 
military propaganda to lure men into joining a ‘righteous cause’.194 It was subsequently 
sustained by the battlefield environment through a cycle of exchanged hostilities.195 
Whether no man’s land between opposing trenches was frequently fought over or if it 
remained mostly quiet depended highly on the location of the front and the culture of the 
units on both sides. Some battlefields were notoriously hostile, but in instances where the 
enemy was neither distant enough to be dehumanized nor brutal enough to be actively 
hated, troops on either side might fall into the pattern of live-and-let-live: a phenomenon 
coined and studied extensively by Tony Ashworth.196 Psychologist Ben Shalit has 
assessed that ‘the nearer or more similar the victim of aggression is, the more we can 
identify with him,’ and the harder it is to kill him.197 The truces which occurred on the 
Western Front during the Great War have acquired legendary proportions in popular 
culture, and they challenge the notion that humans are inherently warlike. However, most 
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truces which occurred were situational, like the ones described by John Beith in context 
of the mutual nightly supply duties of the section of the frontline he served in: 
We perform our nocturnal tasks, in front of and behind the firing trench, amid a perfect hail of star-shells 
and magnesium lights, topped up at times by a searchlight - all supplied by our obliging friend the Hun. 
We, on our part, do our best to return these graceful compliments. The curious and uncanny part of it all is 
that there is no firing … It would be child's play to shell the road behind the enemy's trenches, crowded as 
it must be with ration-waggons and water-carts, into a blood-stained wilderness. But so long as each side 
confines itself to purely defensive and recuperative work, there is little or no interference … After all, if 
you prevent your enemy from drawing his rations, his remedy is simple: he will prevent you from drawing 
yours. Then both parties will have to fight on empty stomachs, and neither of them, tactically, will be a 
penny the better.198 
The rationale behind their actions was clearly the act of self-preservation, and both sides 
were willing to turn a blind eye to attack opportunities to make their battle environment 
as tolerable as it could be for however long they were required to stay there. The most 
famous battlefield truce of Christmas 1914 differed from these situational truces in that 
the war had not been going on for very long, and the military organization had not 
prepared for what might happen in inactive parts of the frontline where the trenches were 
often so close together that the troops could hear one another’s daily activities clearly. 
Such proximity was toxic to dehumanization, and during the Christmas truce British and 
German soldiers in many sectors met peacefully, exchanged presents, took photographs 
and even played soccer. In some extreme cases, Richard Holmes even noted that ‘the 
truce went on until well into the New Year, despite the High Command’s insistence that 
it should be war as usual.’199 Further along in the war, the opportunities for fraternization 
were attempted to be weeded out, so that the soldiers would be able to dehumanize their 
enemy without too much cognitive dissonance. John Adams later wrote about how during 
the next Christmas of 1915 the authorities now tried to stop them from repeating the 
‘entente of last Christmas’, and how one of the officers in his battalion who had been 
present at one of the truces the previous year had a list of German signatures in his 
paybook to show for it.200 
The relationship which the middle-class volunteers of Kitchener’s army shared with their 
enemies on the Western Front drew heavily from the wider contemporary social context. 
Britain at the time was willfully and significantly isolated from the Continent, striving 
towards autonomy both in economic and military matters, while also treating foreign 
cultural influences with doubt or even disdain. G. J. Goschen, referring to Britain in a 
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1896 speech as the First Lord of the Admiralty, said that the country had ‘stood alone in 
that which is called isolation—our splendid isolation…’201 In saying this, he was not 
directly talking about the contentedness of then Victorian Britain about their status as the 
biggest, strongest, and most beautiful empire to have ever existed – yet he might as well 
have been.202 Goschen’s remark was contextualized in a discussion of the increasingly 
hostile international terrain which had developed as the world transitioned to the twentieth 
century. Despite of the long-enjoyed peace, other countries appeared more threatening 
than before as the new age rolled in.203 This consensus which favoured suspicion likely 
also later factored into how the soldiers in the Great War eventually viewed members of 
other groups, whether they be friend or foe. Britain had not had alliances since the 
Crimean War, and the line was likely delivered as praise for the empire’s ability to sustain 
this autonomous position.204 
This isolation policy that had solidified during queen Victoria’s reign did not exist only 
in the realm of geopolitics. Per Samuel Hynes, by the twentieth century, this attitude had 
saturated Britain’s cerebral life as well;  and even though Queen Victoria’s successor king 
Edward was much more receptive to Europe, and especially fond of France, Britain had 
traditionally been quite reluctant to allow foreign influences into the country.205 Even 
with the influence of their king Englishmen were suspicious of what it would do for the 
nation’s morale to let influencers like Ibsen’s plays and French impressionism in.206 
Britain had a sense of moral superiority about its own arts, and a commonly shared 
opinion about the suspect decadence of Continental entertainment.207 Even though 
throughout king Edward’s reign this quarantine on foreign influences was finally being 
lifted, it had left its impression on the population. 208 This culturally internalized distrust 
in their neighbours, when it was accompanied with the rumours of German atrocities in 
Belgium and elsewhere, made it possible for the British to dehumanize their German 
enemies. Robert Keable had been very keen on joining the war from the beginning but 
only got to do so in 1917 after two thwarted attempts before because of his ill health. He 
wrote down how the soldiers had thought at the beginning of the war that the Kaiser was 
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off his head and the Germans a race of slaves. He continued that the eventual contact with 
them on the battlefield had caused some confusion, when many of them realized they 
were not so different to themselves, and that the Kaiser – however mad – could not have 
been responsible for the calamity of the war all by himself. 209  
This isolation mentality is also significant in regards to the British army’s internal 
cohesion. The reason for this lies in the number of possible experiences and ideas that the 
English middle-class people may have shared with one another – which in turn translated 
to better cohesion in the trenches. Less diversity leads to greater kinship through shared 
experiences and views, and thus it can be speculated that in this sense the English middle 
class stood on more solid ground than its corresponding groups on the Continent. 
Additionally, the isolation mentality catered generously to the sense of social identity, the 
existence of which relies on a person’s sense of who they are based on group 
membership.210 Though an out-group was necessary for a cohesive in-group to form, it is 
a consistent trend in military psychology that a soldier fights for his comrades rather than 
against his enemy. The British Expeditionary Force and the personal relationships it 
fostered between its troops were ultimately the backbone which was perceived by the 
surviving veterans to have been the force which motivated them to keep on going. As 
they went to war, they did it for their families – and in the war they fought for the men 
beside them.  It allowed them to commit to the acts of war which they may have never 
taken part of in other circumstances, and the strongest regarded incentive for murderous 
aggression against the enemy has been cited to be the love for one’s comrades against a 
foe identified as threatening that relationship.211 
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3.  The Strain of War 
"Look at the infantryman’s eyes and you can tell how much war he has seen.” 
- Bill Mauldin, a war correspondent of the Second World War.212 
 
3.1. The Act of Killing 
When describing the primary function of a soldier, a military padre in the Great War 
wrote that ‘killing is his first duty, and he only tries to avoid being killed for the sake of 
being efficient.’213 Wars are fought for victory, meaning that soldiers are inevitably 
treated as pawns on a board; expected to die when necessary, and to kill so that victory 
can be secured. In the context of the Great War, this sacrificial element was heightened 
as nations had not yet adapted to the realities of industrial warfare. However, the soldiers 
who were thrown into combat situations were still individuals with their own conscious 
and unconscious desires, which ensured that neither of these duties came easy to them. 
While it is easy to empathize with the soldiers’ reluctance to die, the natural aversion 
humans have towards killing or even harming others is often far less obvious. However, 
the phenomenon of predation death anxiety – the distress and unconscious guilt that arises 
from an individual harming another – is acknowledged by modern psychology; its 
existence and effects have been well documented through numerous studies which 
suggest that violence, especially when taken to its extreme in the act of killing, has a 
heavy toll on the human mind.214 When Kitchener’s volunteers went to war, they left 
behind a world where murder was a taboo of the highest degree, and entered a realm 
where they had to accept that ‘the crime most foul’ was now to be their duty. Their 
subsequent reactions reveal that sometimes the most grueling aspect of the trenches was 
not the constant threat of death, but the demand for participation in the bloodshed. 
This chapter deals with killing and not the general acts of aggression by the Great War 
soldiers because out of all violent acts, killing another human being has a special status 
both in all known human cultures around the world, and in the inner mechanisms of the 
human psyche.215 The irreversible nature of killing has a heightened effect on the 
perpetrator’s mind because it erases all possibility of making amends to one’s victim in 
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the future; its very essence invites existentialism, which can subsequently trigger even 
more remorse than one felt during the act itself. To kill, a decently socialized person must 
both subvert his internalized social norms, and bypass his personal sense of morality.216 
When in war, soldiers are removed from both the personal motives for the kill, as well as 
the emotional outbursts usually associated with incidences of civilians killing one 
another: As such, the burden of killing may weigh on the soldiers especially hard, for they 
are bereft of some of the natural defense mechanisms that guard a killer’s psyche and 
allow them to commit their acts without emotionally shattering them. In the case of 
Kitchener’s volunteers in the Great War, the soldiers were particularly vulnerable: Having 
entered the war as civilians with skewed expectations of what they were going to be faced 
with, they received only limited preparation of actual combat situations before being 
thrown into situations where they had to confront matters of life and death, perhaps for 
the first time in their lives.217 Many of them had troubles approaching the concept of war 
seriously, rather seeming to treat is as an excursion, like Donald Hankey later recollected 
him and his peers doing upon drafting: 
Battle! Battle, murder, and sudden death! Maiming, slaughter, blood, extremities of fear and discomfort 
and pain! How incredibly remote all that seems! We don't believe in it really. It is just a great game we are 
learning ... Just a game, that's all, and then home to tea.218 
Admittedly, Hankey did write these lines retrospectively in his memoirs, and it is much 
easier to mock one’s intentions for dramatic effect after the fact. The excitement which 
was shared by many middle-class men however indicates that these aspects of the war 
had not been properly internalized before the soldiers had to confront them. Psychological 
survey research into the military has suggested that while patriotism and ideology may 
lure young men into joining and play a part in their soldier identity, they end up being far 
from their mind when the bullets begin to fly.219 
Soldiers do nevertheless need to have some justification, however feeble, to rationalize 
to themselves their partaking in acts few of them would willingly do under other 
circumstances.220 Dave Grossman, who has studied the effects killing on battlefields, has 
devised a five-stage model of killing in combat; the stages being concern about the killing, 
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the actual kill, exhilaration, remorse, and rationalization and acceptance.221 The first 
four stages all relate to the execution of the act itself and the most immediate reactions to 
it, while the last stage of rationalization and acceptance deals with the psychological 
mechanism which the combatant needs to succeed at in order to continue functioning as 
they are supposed to. In failing this final stage, they are rendered useless as soldiers either 
by hence refusing to kill altogether, or through suffering psychiatric consequences that 
hinder their performance at best, and utterly psychologically cripple them at worst.222 
While the fear of death is often emphasized by historians as the primary cause for 
psychological stress in war, it is challenged by the fact that history is full of soldiers who 
have committed suicides or mutilated themselves to avoid combat taking part in killing, 
the Great War being no exception to this phenomenon.223 Though often glossed over, 
little talked about, or difficult to tell if the act had been intentional or not, the soldier 
suicides of the trenches were known to their brothers in arms: Siegfried Sassoon, an 
officer in the war and an acclaimed war poet, examined the topic in a more acceptable 
setting than conversation by writing it into a verse of one of his most somber poems: 
I knew a simple soldier boy / Who grinned at life in empty joy / Slept soundly through the lonesome dark / 
And whistled early with the lark. / In winter trenches, cowed and glum / With crumps and lice and lack of 
rum / He put a bullet through his brain. / No one spoke of him again.224 
Grossman considers that the negligence of the average man’s reluctance to kill even at 
the risk of death has unjustly been ignored by those researchers who attempt to understand 
the psychological and sociological pressures of the battlefield, and has stated that: 
Looking another human being in the eye, making an independent decision to kill him, and watching as he 
dies due to your action combine to form the single most basic, important, primal, and potentially traumatic 
occurrence of war. If we understand this, then we understand the magnitude of the horror of killing in 
combat.225 
The perpetrator’s point of view to killing is a subject matter that many historians have 
understandably skirted around, especially when the studied events are relatively recent or 
heavily politicized. In the case of the Great War, however, a few contemporary historians 
have taken the issue under examination. Niall Ferguson and Joanna Bourke have most 
notably left their mark on the discussion: Ferguson through suggesting that ‘many men 
simply took pleasure in killing’, while Bourke has gone as far as to conclude that that 
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‘more men broke down in war because they were not allowed to kill than under the strain 
of killing.’226 They come from two different historiographical schools – Ferguson’s 
conservatism going against Bourke’s constructionism, yet their views on this are 
somewhat adjacent to each other regarding this question. They present support for their 
arguments through citing letters and diaries of the Great War soldiers – not unlike the 
primary sources of this study – and analyzing contemporary casualty statistics from the 
war. Their assertions of soldiers’ willingness to violence can be read as embellished 
attempts to return a part of the previously lost agency back to the Great War soldiers, a 
sentiment that is detectable also in Alexander Watson’s study of British and German 
soldiers and their endurance in the Great War. Watson highlights the resilience and mental 
fortitude found in both armies and criticizes the mainstream portrayal of soldiers as 
helpless sufferers of events far too large for them to comprehend. He states how the 
‘confusing impression’ given by many historians is that ‘while societies and armies 
proved to be very resilient during the war, the individuals who comprised them were 
victims of their situation and susceptible to mental collapse.’227 While Watson entertains 
the idea of combat pleasure, he does not however end up making the ultimate conclusion 
of soldiers possessing a natural bloodlust. 
Having written extensively about the concept of fear, Bourke suggests that the highest 
rates of breakdown were recorded among support troops who were subject to the fear of 
killing without an opportunity to retaliate.228 Edgar Jones has re-evaluated the same 
medical statistics used by Bourke and added in statements from medical officials who 
worked with psychiatric casualties during and after the Great War to prove that virtually 
all admissions to the shell-shock division were from units directly engaged in combat, the 
majority being infantrymen.229 This is supported by studies into combat stress reactions, 
which have found them to be most prevalent in combat-engaging troops.230 The fact that 
non-combatants (such as medics, recon troops, chaplains, and in some instances prisoners 
of war) seem to have been relatively safe from psychiatric disorders also brings the 
connotation to the protective element of killing to question.231 Jones points out that the 
absence of these people in the lists of psychiatric casualties implies that the soldiers most 
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susceptible to psychiatric damage were those not only directly under the threat of a likely 
death, but also those who were expected to kill as well in a context where they were not 
physically or mentally far-removed from the consequences of their actions.232 
Meanwhile, Ferguson uses individual accounts and the Freudian concept of a death drive 
to support his conclusion that battle was an exciting and often pleasurable experience to 
the soldiers.233 His arguments about the joys of war are, however, mostly constructed 
around the effects of various defense and coping mechanisms recognized by modern 
psychological research, and in some instances his assessment of the instances in which 
soldiers’ morale was most susceptible to cracking are simply wrong. For example, 
soldiers in exposed positions were bound to eventually psychologically cave in regardless 
of their characteristic qualities, despite of him asserting that a certain type of esprit de 
corps guarded the men from breakdown.234 However, even if Bourke’s and Ferguson’s 
conclusions are in part questionable, they correctly identified a ‘battlefield high’ which is 
also recognized in Grossman’s model as the euphoria stage. Similarly the question still 
remains how out most of the troops who engaged in combat and killed their enemies 
persevered, if killing was so traumatic.235 
While the psychological structure of the process of killing can be universally 
implemented to the Great War infantry, the contents of each stage varied depending on 
the values which were significant to the soldiers, and how the internalized social norms 
from their civilian lives had conditioned them to respond to certain cues.236 The most 
significant unifying factors for the middle-class volunteers of Kitchener’s army were their 
shared background of a public-school education, participation in pseudo-militaristic 
youth organizations and sports clubs, and the lack of any prior military field service 
experience.237 These young men were often more well versed in classical literature than 
in the challenges and rewards of real life, and their social background had brought them 
up to believe in the sanctity of life as much as in the virtue of justice. Through reading 
Horace, they had learnt that it was sweet to die for one's country, and from Homer’s 
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writings they remembered that it was in battle that one’s worth was demonstrated.238 
Therefore, their rationalization and acceptance stage of coming to terms with killing 
often involved finding justification for their surface-level immoral actions through an 
ulterior utilitarian motive of vanquishing evil.239 On occasion, the soldiers would even 
outright make comparisons between their own conditions and those of the classical 
heroes, like John Adams once did as he looked upon the stars on a quiet night in the 
trenches: 
I shall read Homer in a new light after these times. I begin to understand the spirit of the Homeric heroes; 
it was all words, words, words before. Now I see. Billet life—where is that in the Iliad? In the tents, of 
course. And the eating and drinking, the ' word that puts heart into men,' the cool stolid facing of death, all 
those gruesome details of wounds and weapons, all is being enacted here every day exactly as in the 
Homeric age. Human nature has not altered … Under the stars and in a trench you were as good as any 
Homeric warrior; but you were little better. And so you felt you understood him.240 
Adams had been an accomplished student of the Classics during his time in school, and 
on several occasions used his knowledge of them to make sense of his own experiences 
on the front. The volunteers were inspired by old war stories, the belligerent heroes in the 
literature they consumed, and by the patriotism ubiquitously present in contemporary 
middle-class youth associations.241 Boys’ magazines during the pre-war era celebrated 
public schools and the ‘public school spirit’, while also advocating sports and featuring 
articles which were meant to teach their readers the proper middle-class ethics of Britain 
at the time.242 They were, too, trying to instill ‘character’ into the younger generations. 
These magazines were deliberate tools of value education; few of the most popular boys’ 
magazines at the time, The Boy's Own Paper, Young England, Chums and The Captain 
all used the same writers, and expressed the middle-class ethics in a uniform manner 
throughout the magazines’ pages.243 For comparison, the masculine heroes for the adult 
men of the middle class included people such as the bodybuilder Eugen Sandow, and 
Sherlock Holmes, who even in all of his bohemian eccentricity was also an excellent 
boxer and a swordsman. 
When the young men educated in this culture flocked to service, everyone had their own 
ideas of what the war was going to be, and what participating in it meant for them 
personally. Many were excited to go to war, but a part of the excitement was likely related 
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to the age of many of the soldiers: Out in the world for the first time on their own, 
shouldering responsibilities which, during the less stressful times on the front, may not 
have been as soul-crushing as they were empowering.244 The prospect of killing was a 
concept that these men had likely at most considered in power fantasies of imaginary 
duels, or of performing heroic acts in the war. During his initial training Arthur Gibbs, 
for example, already pictured himself ‘picking up Boches on my lance like a row of pigs 
– a and I hadn’t even handled a real lance as yet!’245 The sort of killing on an industrial 
scale that they would get involved in in the Great War they could not even have imagined, 
let alone be prepared for. Private George Coppard recalls how his regard for trench 
warfare changed after the initial novelty had been overturned by cold reality: 
The first few months, trench warfare had been a kind of dangerous fun to me. Although only a boy I had 
lived with grown men, sharing their fears and dangers. It was still fun when not in the trenches. Up in the 
front line, however, anything approaching merriment was dead.’246 
By the time they were on the front, they sometimes ended up using imagery of hunting or 
sports as they took part in the killing, as per the conventions and ideals of their middle-
class upbringing.247 Donald Hankey attested to this by stating that from his earliest 
schooldays, the public-school man had been taught that the mark of a gentleman was to 
welcome danger and that war was ‘a glorified form of big-game hunting – the highest 
form of sport.’248  By attending to the psychological need to make sense of what was 
happening around them through such comparisons, they put psychological distance 
between themselves and the crushing reality, thus making it easier for themselves to ‘play 
their part’ in the war. Humour as a coping mechanism had a particularly significant effect 
in this process of acknowledgement of the kills. For instance, an Oxford graduate Captain 
Harry Yoxall once wrote about how one of his own machine gunners tended to play tunes 
with his gun, and recounts an incident when ‘he fired a burst of fire with the Pom-tiddly-
om-pom cadence to which the Fritz replied with a Pom-pom, and hit two men of ours who 
were on a working party.’249 The reality of the situation was likened to a ‘game’ ladened 
with dark humour by Yoxall, which made the fact that men under his command were 
dropping like flies for no particular aim easier to bear. 
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As military expert Bruce Newsome has demonstrated, the motivation to join the armed 
forces was different from the motivation needed to sustain a man through combat.250 
Sometimes the men went through experiences in the line that incited individual 
motivation for the killing without the need of outside encouragement, such as when a 
close friend or a relative had recently died in the hands of the enemy. Wilfred Bion, who 
served in the Tank Corps as an officer and would later pioneer as a psychoanalyst in the 
treating mental disorders, described an event of having to subdue a tank driver who had 
begun to unrestrainedly shoot at a group of German prisoners while screaming that they 
had killed his brother.251 Without intrinsic motivation such as this, however, it is difficult 
to convince people to kill. Lieutenant George Roupell, who had trained in the Royal 
Military College and commissioned in the army just two years before the outbreak of the 
Great War, had major problems with this as he was commanding the Kitchener’s 
volunteers. He stated that the only way he could stop his men from firing into the air was 
to draw his sword and walk down the trench, ‘beating the men on the backside and, as I 
got their attention, telling them to fire low.’252 To get people to take the step from concern 
about the killing to the actual kill, the frontline was structured in such ways that created 
leverage over the troops’ individual desires to remain passive. Throughout their basic 
training, the Kitchener’s volunteers had been inculcated into a distinct martial culture, 
which through the erasing of their civilian identities made them susceptible to the 
psychological mechanisms that rely on the group’s hierarchical structures and shared 
ideology rather than on individuals’ feelings and morality.253 This continued  as they were 
transferred to the front, and the demands of authority and group absolution both worked 
as a trigger to start the process of killing, but also helped the soldiers to rationalize and 
accept their deeds after they had been committed. 
During the months of basic training, the Kitchener’s volunteers had gone through rites of 
initiation to the army, which involved adopting a soldier’s identity alongside their already 
existing civilian selves, with new codes of conduct and social norms that dictated what 
were the appropriate ways to behave.254 When eventually taken to the Western Front, they 
were even further removed from their original environment, and the military 
organization’s emphasis on maintaining cohesion ensured that the feedback to the soldiers 
                                                          
250 Newsome 2003, 24–6. 
251 Bion 1982, 137. 
252 IWM, DOCS: Roupell George, typescript account, 3–4. 
253 Watson 2008, 57. 
254 ibid. 
52 
 
was continuously enforcing behavior which was deemed favorable towards the war aims. 
The demands of authority on the front were ever-present, and through repeatedly 
conforming to the established system, the soldiers primed themselves to accept the 
military hierarchy as an unquestionable authority figure in the future as well. The 
authority of the military was enforced at every turn either explicitly or insidiously: Such 
as when in attempting to appeal to the soldiers’ religious feeling, the soldiers were even 
told to put their lives into ‘God’s keeping’ so that they could ‘shelve all responsibility and 
go forward with a quiet mind in the knowledge that God is at the helm and that nothing 
can happen without his sanction.’255 
The routine of the front lines helped to desensitize the soldiers of the values that had 
defined their identities as civilians. Moral desensitization also occurred upon arriving at 
the front through the shock and confusion of moving from one end of the ethical scale to 
another, which could then leave the individual detached from the moral structures they 
built upon themselves in their civilian life.256Arthur G. Heath reminisced in a letter to his 
female friend of how grim it was to read as a censor the affectionate letters from his 
company’s snipers in which they – amidst lots of home gossip – prided themselves in 
getting on well at their ‘job’. He writes how he could often hear them compete with one 
another about whose count was the highest, and that the reality was that it was ‘murder 
in cold blood’ in which they were competing in.257 In war, the extremes on the scale of 
ethics can come so quickly that moral injury results in the confusion it creates, leaving 
the individual detached from the moral structures they built upon themselves in their 
civilian life. Soldiers in the Great War were primed to obey orders without question, and 
when they were made to take part in ‘going over the top’, a speedy advance was 
encouraged as it provided the chance of capturing or killing enemy garrisons before they 
were able to climb out of their shelter or operate their weapons.258 This sometimes led to 
the killing of surrendering enemy troops, to which Guy Chapman, who had been educated 
a lawyer in Oxford, once simply remarked that ‘if you start a man killing, you can’t turn 
him off again like an engine.’259 In the Great War context, the obedience to authority 
worked as a shield for both the psyches of the commanding officers and the troops who 
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carried out their orders. While the troops could rationalize for themselves that they were 
only obeying orders, the weight of decisions was somewhat removed from the officers’ 
shoulders by the act being carried out by others creating physical and psychological 
distance between their decisions and the consequences of those decisions. Heath himself 
wrote that he thought the war was essentially for the phlegmatic and callous, and that he 
should be much happier if he didn’t mind the sight of a man with his head blown clean 
off, indicating that as an officer he could not fully remove himself from the deeds and 
experience of his men.260 
Another source of social pressure in the trenches came from the other combatants. If an 
individual is bonded with his comrades, and if he is with ‘his’ group, then the probability 
that he will participate in killing is significantly increased through the process of group 
absolution.261 In the absence of these factors, the probability that the individual will be 
an active participant in combat is quite low.262 Group absolution makes the group 
member’s accountability to the group more prominent, and if a soldier feels he would be 
letting his friends down by not participating in the shared process of killing, the act 
becomes easier to see through.263 Shalit’s study about psychiatric casualties on 
battlefields have found that once troops have seen combat, their first concern changes 
from a self-preserving fear of death and injury to the fear of not being able to meet the 
obligations of combat – thus letting their fellow soldiers down.264 This can be partly seen 
in the fact that crew served weapons, such as machine guns, consistently account to much 
more kills than rifles.265 For the volunteers of Kitchener’s army, it does seem that they 
regularly formed very intense bonds with their group: If the primary reason for joining 
the war for middle-class men had been to protect their homeland and loved ones, in war 
they found their motivation in the immediate relationships they had with their fellow 
soldiers. The effect of the group was not always corruptive, however, or at least the 
soldiers themselves preferred to latch onto the good qualities of their fellow men while 
overlooking the faults. In Donald Hankey’s opinion, the actual experience of the war 
brought out the best qualities of men; their pluck, their indomitable spirits, their humour, 
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and their readiness to shoulder a weaker brother’s burden in addition to their own.266 
Similarly, the wartime poet and writer Richard Aldington emphasized in his partially 
autobiographical novel that the mutual care men had for each other had a civilizing effect: 
They had every excuse for turning into brutes, and they hadn’t done it … They had saved something from 
a gigantic wreck, and what they had saved was immensely important-manhood and comradeship, their 
essential integrity as men, their essential brotherhood as men.267 
How the soldiers of the Great War reacted to killing depended on several factors, but the 
easiest way to begin assessing its psychological effects is to locate the battle positions 
and situations where most killings occurred. Fifty-nine percent of casualties were a result 
of artillery, and three times as many men were killed by shells as by bullets.268 
Meanwhile, face-to-face killing with bayonets and sharpened tools accounted only for 
half a percent of wounds in the German and British armies, and grenades caused less than 
three percent of wounds.269 Out of the combatant troops, those who were furthest from 
the front, such as artillery men, were the least likely to receive admissions to psychiatric 
care.270 According to Grossman, being too far removed from the effects of their work to 
witness it in any direct way resulted in lowered chances of them becoming psychiatric 
casualties.271 In the Great War, most of the soldiers’ time was spent out of battle, and 
when the battle was on, killing often occurred from a distance. John Adams reflected upon 
the instrumentality of the killing which focused on the ‘drawing of the bow’ instead of 
the ‘landing of the arrow’ after witnessing a particularly traumatic sight of a fellow officer 
blown to pieces: 
No man could keep on killing, if he could see the men he killed. Who had fired that howitzer shell? He 
would never see his handiwork, never know what he had done today. He would never see; that was the 
point. Had he known, he would have rejoiced that there was one Englishman less in the world. It was not 
his fault. We were just the same. What of last night's bombardment? Had we not watched with glittering 
eyes the magnificent shooting of our own gunners?272 
This development owed itself to the evolution of industrial arms: Denis Winter for once 
has assessed that just six machine-guns could hold up a brigade, and the general reality 
of modern weapons made it so that opposing rarely came close to one another.273 Spenser 
Wilkinson, who was at the time renowned for his analysis of military strategies, stated in 
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1914 that ‘infantry that can shoot well and that have plenty of ammunition will never let 
an enemy's infantry come near enough to them to cross bayonets; they will shoot them 
down first.’274 As evident of how the war unfolded, his assessment was right, and most 
of the killing in the trenches happened from a distance. 
Based on what veterans have remembered from the war and how they describe events at 
the time, all forms of distance seem to play a big part in allowing the soldier to kill without 
severe psychological consequences. When they were close enough to identify with their 
enemy, the killing could turn traumatic very quickly. Physical distance has been found to 
have an inhibiting effect on the consequences of these stressors, compared to having to 
experience them at close-range.275 It not only removed the soldiers from the certainty of 
knowledge that it had been their bullet which fell the enemy, but it also removed them 
from the immediate effects of their actions. Private Rudge, only seventeen years old as 
he entered the war, wrote about his experience of killing when he had not yet realized the 
mental repercussions of connecting with his victim: 
This was the first time I had killed anybody and when things quieted down I went and looked at a German 
I knew I had shot. I remembered thinking that he looked old enough to have a family and I felt very sorry.276 
The adolescent soldiers who had joined the war for ideological reasons were especially 
susceptible to rationalizing their kills by the psychological process of enmification. Per 
Grossman’s analysis, ‘once he begins to herd people like cattle and then to slaughter them 
like cattle, he very quickly begins to think of them as cattle.’277 The descriptions of killing 
in the Great War soldiers’ letters and diaries rarely pay attention the enemy as a fellow 
human being, either avoiding the fact entirely or glossing over it.278 Harry Yoxall, for 
example, while once describing the death of an enemy sniper, seemed much more 
interested in the process of dispatching the mortar bomb than in the fact that he had killed 
a man.279 He was a mortar officer, and seems to have coped with his deed by treating it 
as a job like any other which, if performed well, would reflect on him positively. Joanna 
Bourke has argued that ‘combatants insisted upon emotional relationships and 
responsibility’ with and for their victims, but the evidence points towards the contrary: 
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The enemy seems to have been the hardest to kill when they were close and exhibited 
behavior that the perpetrator could identify with.280 
In the case of the Great War, the brutality of the battles has been recounted by many 
historians, but a prime example of how impersonal and efficiency-driven the killing was 
that machine gunners would set their guns to fire just slightly above the ground, sweeping 
from side to side over no man’s land.281 In this way men were caught in the legs by the 
bullets, causing them to fall so that their heads were then in prime position to be hit by 
another round of bullets. The stress of the battlefield could trigger an extreme type of 
avoidance in the form of detachment, in which the soldier could enter a stage after the 
battle was over where it was extremely difficult to recall the details of what had just 
happened. Some soldiers took this as a blessing, such as the career soldier Francis Crozier, 
who observed that ‘God is merciful and it almost seems as though he chloroforms us on 
these occasions.’282 Often the veterans of the Great War would only gain a sense of the 
order and substance of the battles they were involved in after a historian had pieced 
together the accounts of the events and put them under a title such as the ‘Somme 
offensive’. For the individual soldiers, battles were often confusing and isolated 
experiences. On the instant of advance and in the absence of a practicable field radio, 
fighting men became detached from their order-giving roots, unable to receive signals. 
Rudyard Kipling remarked that ‘men could give hideous, isolated experiences of their 
own, but no man could recall any connected order of events.’283 Yoxall recalled that in 
heated battle ‘you lose all your senses’ and could often only recall ‘a mass of confused 
memories.’284 Many of the events that rise from the fog concern singular events of the 
deaths of certain men: One soldier could distinctly recall a German with a pork-pie hat 
jumping up and subsequently collapsing ‘like a pole-axed ox, with a distinct hole in his 
throat above the collar.’285 These events ripped the soldiers from their cognitive 
dissonance in which they were simply performing their duties, and highlighted the reality 
in which they were actually partaking in, and on occasion resulted in psychiatric trauma. 
A willingness to die for one’s country does not necessarily correlate with willingness to 
take someone else’s life for the same reason, and the Great War produced a number of 
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veterans who either truthfully or self-deceptively lived for the rest of their lives under the 
impression that they never fired a single shot with the mind to kill.286 Nevertheless, the 
Great War also undeniably produced a number of soldiers who self-proclaimedly and 
convincingly enjoyed the process of killing. This can however be partially explained by 
the results of Swank and Marchand’s study of US infantry in north-west Europe which 
showed that, after sixty days of continuous combat, ninety-eight percent of surviving 
soldiers were likely to have become psychiatric casualties of some kind, with the 
remaining two percent exhibiting a predisposition to an ‘aggressive psychopathic 
personality,’ which would put the proportion of sociopathic soldiers well-within the 
boundaries of civilian men.287 Meanwhile, the group of soldiers who best exemplified 
humanity’s natural aversion towards killing were the men who decided to refrain from 
the act entirely either through the voluntary decision to not use their weapons to kill, or 
by committing suicide. Like was the case with Lieutenant Roupell, who had to beat his 
men to get them to fire at the enemy, another veteran of the Great War has also pointed 
out that, based on his experiences, non-firers could be a problem in any future war and 
that it was a great effort for him to make some men fire their rifles to avoid them becoming 
casualties through inaction.288 Marshall has explained the reluctance to fire in soldiers as 
‘an emotional and not an intellectual handicap,’ going on to say that it ‘is not removable 
by intellectual reasoning, such as ‘kill or be killed’’289 The soldiers who fall under this 
category could be hypothesized to have failed in the enmification process so utterly that 
the thought of killing a human being just like them became unbearable enough to 
endanger their own lives. This still left them with the demands of authority and group 
absolution, of which Grossman concluded that: 
On the one hand, the soldier can resist the incredibly powerful array of forces that call for him to kill, and 
he will instantly be denied by his nation, his leaders, and his friends and will most likely be executed along 
with the other victims of this horror. On the other hand, the soldier can bow before the social and 
psychological forces that demand that he kill, and in doing so he will be strangely empowered.290 
The psychiatric consequences to killing that occurred on battlefields can be difficult to 
distinguish from the disorders that were the result of the threat of dying. Neither of these 
stressors occurred independently of each other in the trenches, and both were intrinsically 
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tied to physiological stressors present in the frontline, such as hunger and sleep 
deprivation. However, the case for killing being a particularly strong source of stress on 
the battlefield is supported by modern psychological research: In the case of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) – recognized for the first time in the Great War 
under the name ‘shell shock’ – which was and is commonly associated with the trauma 
of the uncontrollable aspects of artillery fire, traumas of human origin have been 
discovered to be a particularly potent cause for psychiatric problems.291 It has been shown 
in a number of modern wars that psychiatric battle casualties fluctuated in direct 
relationship to the wounded rate. Because offensives usually led to far higher physical 
casualties than defensive operations, it seems that breakdowns were more common during 
offensive operations when soldiers were given the opportunity to express aggressive 
instincts.292 This highlights the destructive effect that forced hostility could have on the 
troops, and as John Adams thought about war after the traumatic death of his fellow 
officer, he came to a conclusion: 
What made war so cruel, was the force that compelled you to go on. After a factory explosion you cleared 
up things and then took every precaution to prevent its recurrence; but in war you did the opposite, you 
used all your energies to make more explosions. You killed and went on killing.293 
In saying this, he acknowledged the humanity of his enemy and tied it to the suffering he 
himself suffered – in doing so recognizing the primary cause for the traumatic effect of 
killing. The other aspect of his anguish, having to live with the death of his comrades and 
the constant threat of his own demise, will be explored in the next chapter. 
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3.2. The Threat of Dying 
The fear of dying, or predation death anxiety, is the most basic of all evolutionary fears.294 
No one wants to die, and Ben Shalit has uncovered that soldiers prior to deployment 
reported that the fear of ‘death and injury’ was their primary fear about battle.295 
However, while killing other people has not been an evolutionary prerequisite, death has 
lurked around every corner for humans since we first became aware of our own mortality. 
Throughout history it has often arrived painfully, too soon, or to undeserving people. 
People have always watched others die around them whilst knowing that they too would 
eventually die, which is precisely the reason why humans have become quite adequate at 
psychologically coping with the thought, and why most of the soldiers in the Great War 
likewise managed to endure it through the conflict. The men on the front were not 
oblivious to the danger of their circumstances, though depending on the context, their 
estimations could vary from highly pessimistic to the absurdly hopeful.296 In the British 
army, a total of 11,8 percent of all mobilized men were killed, a number that would have 
been much higher among just the combatant troops, had calculations specifically 
concerning fighting factions been made.297 In the trenches the death rates were lower than 
on more mobile fronts, contrary to the popular perception, and Hew Stratchan has 
observed accordingly that ‘the war would have been far more horrific if there had been 
no trenches.’298 However, the implication of the higher rate of psychiatric casualties at 
the same time is that, for the soldiers, the trenches of the Western Front mostly 
represented misery from which they were lucky to get out of alive. 
If the act of killing requires the rationalization and acceptance of the act for the 
perpetrator to go on without psychologically collapsing, the threat of dying similarly 
requires defense and coping mechanisms for one’s sanity to persist. The Kübler-Ross 
model – which also partially inspired Dave Grossman’s stages of killing – is a system 
which divides grief into five separate stages based on the emotions which a person must 
go through when working their way through loss.299 The five stages of the model are 
denial, anger, bargaining, depression and acceptance. The model was inspired by the 
                                                          
294 Even unicellular organisms have been detected to have receptors that have evolved to react to external dangers in an act of self-
preservation. See Castano et al. 2011, 616. 
295 Shalit 1988, 11. 
296 Second Lieutenant Hamilton estimated in 1915 that ‘90% of Captains & subalterns of infantry will be washed out’ before the war, 
as will ‘50% of the men.’ See IWM, 87/8/1: R.P. Hamilton, letter to cousin, 3 June 1915. 
297 Watson 2008, 20. 
298 Watson 2008, 24; Strachan 2003, 159. 
299 Kübler-Ross & Kessler 2009. 
60 
 
coming-to-terms progress of the terminally ill, but can be implemented into various 
comparable situations, such as soldiers coming to terms with their mortality on the high-
risk environment of a battlefield. In the frontline, the Great War soldier had to deal with 
both the death of his comrades, and the inescapable possibility of a premature death of 
his own. In the denial phase, soldiers would refrain from considering the possibility, 
which was both a result of the positive illusions that the soldiers tended to gravitate 
towards regarding their own chances of survival, and of conscious avoidance towards 
thinking about one’s own mortality. Anger featured most prominently when a fellow 
soldier had been killed, and in many circumstances on the battlefield, the reaction could 
be utilized by directing it into hostilities against the enemy.300 Bargaining could be 
witnessed in the religiously hued ritualistic behavior of the soldiers, and the consecutive 
superstitious illusion that if one only went through the (often arbitrarily) selected motions, 
they would be spared. Depression most commonly showed in the form of apathy in the 
soldiers, which could take away any interest of actively protecting themselves, but which 
could also result in the taking of one’s own life rather than facing ‘the aggression and 
hostility of a very hostile world.’301 Finally, the acceptance phase was responsible for 
producing a shared sense of fatalism which prevailed in many of the soldiers’ accounts 
and is remembered by them to have been shared by especially those men who had been 
on the front for a long time. 
It is not so controversial to suggest that there is inherent tragedy in the death of soldiers, 
which is why – compared to the subject of killing in war – the topic of the attitudes and 
responses to dying has traditionally been much more approachable for historians. In the 
Great War context, however, the tone of historiography concerning war casualties has 
gradually shifted over the years: Starting as heroes, the soldiers turned from heroes to 
victims during the latter half of the century, and as the veterans themselves withered away 
the narrative which was built upon tragedy and injustice came to be regarded as the most 
legitimate one.302 A.J.P. Taylor’s Illustrated history of the First World War in 1964 
solidified the narrative in which the politicians and generals of the Great War threw away 
and wasted the lives of the men who had to fight the war on the ground, establishing the 
picture of them as victims of their circumstance.303 Since the revisionists have begun to 
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take part in the discussion, a new narrative focusing on the soldiers as both active agents 
and as resilient survivors has emerged. Most historians in either camp have broadly 
agreed, however, that the fear of death was the most prominent cause of stress for soldiers 
in the trenches, and thus it is regularly present as a more integral part of any history of 
the Great War. 
In attempting to understand the men’s experience on the Western Front, historians 
sometimes suffer from trying to view the horrors as objectively and impartially as 
possible. The soldiers, however, were far less keen or even capable of viewing their 
surroundings objectively, especially if the experience dealt with death anxiety. More 
often than not, they would either consciously or unconsciously perceive their environment 
as being ultimately in their favour, an effect of unrealistically optimistic future projections 
which distort the individual’s judgement concerning their own mortality.304 Dave 
Grossman has pointed out the prevalence of positive illusions in civilian society as well, 
and stated that if the fear of death were the primary reason for psychiatric casualties in 
combat, then ‘extreme sports, speeding, and a hundred of other methods to experience a 
fleeting fear of death wouldn’t be as popular.’305 He acknowledges the fear of death as an 
important ingredient in creating a psychologically stressful environment in war, but 
criticizes the thought that it would be the sole, or even main concern of soldiers. As such, 
even if the potency of the fear of death is acknowledged, one must also acknowledge the 
psychological mechanisms that humans have in place to cope with the thought. 
The study by Shalit that found that the fear of death and injury turns into the fear of letting 
one’s comrades down once combatants have seen battle implies that ascribing the fear of 
death as soldiers’ primary concern is at least partially a correct assumption, but that the 
battlefield as an environment affects the soldiers in such a way that they ‘get used to it’, 
and turn their attention to other things.306 This assessment falls in line with the Kübler-
Ross model while also making sense from a survivalist perspective. The battlefield offers 
soldiers a limited amount of control over their individual safety, and as such the survival 
of the group becomes the thing to which they can focus on to in order to contribute their 
own survival as well. This process is also related to the process of emotional 
desensitization, which through constant exposure to extreme emotional triggers numbs an 
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individual’s emotional responses.307 This sort of avoidance has been recorded by many 
Great War soldiers, especially when recounting situations of extreme stress, such as the 
heat of the battle. Major Cotton, who saw many of his friends die in action and reflected 
upon their deaths in his letters, observed the phenomenon by saying that ‘somehow war 
is war and mercifully one’s feelings adapt themselves to circumstances which otherwise 
would be unbearable.’308 While the soldiers in the frontline often learnt to live with 
danger, it does not however mean that they suddenly came into terms with the prospect 
of dying: Rather it is telling of the shifting focus that the soldiers psyche goes through 
once they are forced to rely on defense and coping mechanisms to endure massive 
amounts of stress. G.B. Manwaring, a young officer in Kitchener’s army of whose letters 
to his family a portion were published already while he was in active service, stated that 
fear was with him and his men, but that ‘slowly one learns to conquer it, and that makes 
the achievement the greater.’309 
The middle-class volunteers of Kitchener’s army came from a society which ensured that 
they were no complete strangers to death even as civilians: Britain in the early twentieth 
century had not yet discovered treatments for many of the illnesses which are curable 
today but were deadly back then, and people were much more susceptible to death by 
accident as well.310 Death was to be faced courageously, especially if one wished to be a 
man of ‘character’. Middle-class boys and young men were taught to love the fatherland 
and be ready to sacrifice their lives in its defense. They learned to obey orders and not 
flinch from danger or unpleasant duty.311 A soldiers’ conduct was tightly associated with 
masculinity and when the men went to war, cowardice in the face of death was without 
fail looked down upon as an inherently non-masculine trait.312 Being called a ‘sissy’ was 
the worst thing that could happen to a soldier, and the effect of his peers and the 
comradeship that formed in the army units simultaneously worked as a way of support, 
repression, and control.313 Commentators of the war have consequently said that for 
combatants the fear of being killed came long way behind the fear of being thought of as 
a coward. The fear of having one’s manhood questioned could sometimes quite literally 
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override a fear for one’s life by prompting men into reckless behavior, often with fatal 
consequences. 
Lieutenant Edward Chapman recalls a fearless officer colleague, who ‘would not take any 
notice of flares or snipers, and was shot dead, the bullet going from ear to ear.’314 The 
social prerequisite towards British Great War officers was for them not to show fear in 
the face of death, and in some units it became common practice for the officers to never 
duck, even when under direct fire.315 The expectations the middle-class volunteers often 
had about the war had a heroic ideal attached to them, owing to the popular culture of 
military heroes and war stories, which had emphasized the role of an individual masculine 
protagonist. In the dueling culture, which was still alive and well in Europe at the time of 
the war, death was seen as a lesser evil to losing face, and a heroic death was seen by 
some as a method of validating one’s existence and cementing the nature of their character 
in the minds of others.316 In the Great War, this sometimes led to endangering oneself as 
the men sought out opportunities to prove their worth and potentially earn a medal for 
it.317 A telling instance of this is how once some men erected a sign ‘Gott strafe the 
Kaiser’ in their segment of the trenches, revealing their position in the process and getting 
eight men getting killed in the subsequent mortar shoot.318 As Joanna Bourke points out, 
however, classical heroism could not ultimately survive the horrors of industrial twentieth 
century warfare.319 Had it ever even existed, by 1914 tide-turning war heroes were long 
since a thing of the past, for the sake of modern weaponry and the resulting long-distance 
battles. 
The military organization at the time of the Great War was not particularly understanding 
towards soldiers who went through trauma and became incapable of continuing to fight. 
At the beginning of the Great War, soldiers who broke down were commonly regarded 
by the contemporary military institution as ‘men constitutionally weak of nerve and 
lacking the power to pull themselves together in the face of an emergency.’320 This is a 
telling sign of the lack of understanding of the inner mechanisms of the psyche prevalent 
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at the time, which in part influenced how the conditions were structured around the 
soldiers. While psychology was quickly gaining traction as a respectable science by the 
twentieth century, it has been accused as being somewhat behind in Britain before the 
Great War compared to the other sciences developing during this time.321 Rather than 
psychological theories, the contemporary English middle-class circles still understood 
themselves more through spiritual and philosophical concepts, yet they viewed 
themselves most of all in relation to the established ideas and practices of their social 
context.322 The class-consciousness of the contemporary Britain was also well-imbedded 
into its military organization: The idea was that a certain social background would be a 
determining factor of a soldier’s mental fortitude on the field, and in this hierarchy the 
middle and upper classes were both naturally placed at the top. A much higher emphasis 
was given to the natural characteristics of a soldier, and not the effects of wartime 
circumstances with a power to democratize groups of soldiers by eliciting universal 
human responses in all of them. The Great War subsequently transformed many people’s 
beliefs about the nature of courage, of which Lord Moran serves as a great example, later 
recording that what he took away from the war was that courage ‘is willpower that can 
be spent – and when it is used up – men are finished.’323 
The ways in which a soldier could get injured and die in the trenches were numerous and 
unpleasant. Machine guns could mow them down while advancing through no man’s 
land, or they might be knocked out by a sniper’s bullet while enjoying a cup of ‘char’ a 
step too close to the parapet.324 A grenade, a gas shell, or a mortar might drop on their 
location and either do them in right then and there, or otherwise incapacitate them; and if 
they survived through that, nature could still claim them through weather or disease.325 
The constant threat was vividly encapsulated by Manwaring’s letter in which he 
nonchalantly mentioned how life was proven to still be interesting as he had just found a 
‘Hun’ disguised as a bush, but that the constant strain of danger was beginning to tell 
also.326 The trench environment was unforgiving, yet many soldiers never lost the hope 
that peace was just around the corner. This was especially true for many of the Kitchener’s 
volunteers in the initial stages of the war, when they could still believe they would be 
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‘home before Xmas.’327 Belief in an imminent end to the war was helpful in maintaining 
both the men’s mental stability and army discipline, because it encouraged soldiers to 
focus on short-term rather than cumulative risk. The fact that the human mind is not 
statistically inclined can be seen in the horrors of the war which get pronounced visibility 
in the letters and diaries of the soldiers, of which artillery and gas are a suitable example. 
Upon arriving at the front, men were often ignorant of the power of modern weaponry. 
One British soldier described shells as being first ‘quite a novelty’ and didn’t feel 
frightened because he ‘didn’t know anything about them.’328 Sentiments such as these 
could not last long on the battlefield, however, and the soldiers of the Great War have 
consequently been described as having gone insane from just the wait of another shelling 
on their position.329 While this may be an exaggeration, the aspects of artillery fire that 
incited fear in soldiers speak of the construction of the human mind. The features which 
soldiers bring up frequently – and are also frequently noted by historians – are the noise 
of the weapons, their unpredictability, and the helplessness of individuals under a barrage; 
all of which are recognized in military research as prominent battlefield stressors.330 Gas, 
despite of its much less lethal effect, was the other popular weapon to feature in poetry 
and war stories meant to shock the audience.331 In his poem Dulce et decorum est, the 
famous Great War poet Wilfred Owen used gas specifically to underline the horrors he 
had witnessed: 
Gas! GAS! Quick, boys! An ecstasy of fumbling / Fitting the clumsy helmets just in time / But someone 
still was yelling out and stumbling / And flound’ring like a man in fire or lime / Dim through the misty 
panes and thick green light / As under a green sea, I saw him drowning.332 
Lieutenant Arthur Behrend would similarly describe the noise of the artillery barrage as 
‘so intense that it seemed as if hundred devils were hammering my brain.’333 Both 
weapons share the sense of a loss of control which come from being subjected to them, 
artillery with its unpredictability, and gas with its insidious tendency to leave pools of 
residue to wait the unsuspecting soldier to take cover in an infested dugout, only to find 
themselves blind and suffocating. This loss of control is the most commonly emphasized 
cause of psychiatric stress by historians, which is also likely partially responsible for the 
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fact that killing has been interpreted as less stressful than dying.334 The reason why many 
of the descriptions of the most traumatic weapons of the war are so stylized – like Owen’s 
and Behrend’s are –  may result from the middle-class soldiers’ understanding of their 
familiar literary tradition. In writing about their traumatic experiences, soldiers often 
found it frustrating that they could not convey the pure experience in words and thus 
resorted to clichés and quoted rhetoric of the classics, thus reconstructing their 
experiences retrospectively to a story form that they could recognize. Some soldiers were 
even aware of their literary bias, such as Alexander Aitken, who once recalled that in the 
midst of battle ‘no thought of death came, only some phrase like ‘sledge-hammer blow,’ 
from a serial read years before in a boys’ magazine.’335 It was Aitkens who noted that 
upon attempting to describe the events ‘truthfully’, he ended up weakening it to the 
‘merely clinical,’ which indicates that the style of stripped down realism was far too alien 
to most men for them to write about their experiences even with an attempted objectivity. 
Upon learning that euphemisms such as sharp and brisk fighting meant that about fifty 
percent of a company had been killed or wounded in a raid, Aitken noted that ‘a future 
historian, if he learned at all on these carefully sieved accounts, would be quite misled.’336 
The soldiers would consciously and unconsciously attempt to cope with these battlefield 
stressors through defense and coping mechanisms. One of the most prominent features of 
the human psyche which manifested in the trenches was the focus on the short-term, 
which ties to the phenomenon of positive illusions. Historians have on occasion explained 
the unrealistic optimism found on battlefields as a form of inability to imagine one’s own 
death: Niall Ferguson for once has ascribed to the Freudian worldview which asserts that 
‘no instinct we possess is ready for a belief in [their own] death’.337 And indeed, soldiers’ 
diaries and letters usually depict a highly optimistic attitude towards one’s own survival 
chances, which Watson believes stems not only from fantasy, but from the men’s biased 
interpretation of the trench environment in their own favour.338 ‘The nature of risk is 
shaped by the time horizon,’ and in short-term thinking death didn’t seem as impending: 
Outside of action an average of one man per six days was killed, while in battles the 
average was six men per a day.339 Such intense action was very rare, however, and the 
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Great War artillery was also notoriously inaccurate – a fact which was also noted by the 
soldiers.340 When the British realized that bullets as well only rarely inflicted mortal 
injuries, they began to wish for ‘Blighties’, minor injuries that would be their ticket 
home.341 When the middle-class ranker Arthur Wrench finally received his –  who had by 
then seen the battles of Somme and the third Ypres – he praised the lord for he was finally 
wounded enough to go home.342 Normally soldiers did possess a slight measure of control 
over their own fates: Mortar bombs could sometimes be dodged and shell trajectories 
learnt to be recognized through the whizzing sound they produced. The problem with this 
was that the men tended to become optimistic of their skills and the control they provided 
them, which has led to Watson concluding that: 
By imposing an imagined structure and order on the frightening and unpredictable environment in which 
they operated, soldiers made it seem less chaotic and threatening and provided themselves with a sense of 
security and empowerment crucial for mental health.343 
A possible explanation for the positive illusions present in the trenches can also be found 
in a study carried out by psychologists Shelley Taylor and Jonathon Brown, in which they 
found that individuals ‘possess unrealistically positive views of themselves, an 
exaggerated belief in their ability to control their environment, and a view of the future 
that maintains that their future will be far better than the average person’s.’344 They argue 
that positive illusions ‘may be especially apparent and adaptive under circumstances of 
adversity, that is, circumstances that might be expected to produce depression or lack of 
motivation.’345 
Religious faith also provided mental support for many British troops, both as a 
reassurance of continued life, and comfort in death.346 In the absence of a promise of 
security, certainty, and control in their everyday world, men easily turned to the 
supernatural for comfort. The desire for control was so strong that even with the 
implication that God was behind the carnage and bloodshed all around them, religion 
provided the soldiers with a sense of security in an ultimate ‘plan’ for them, rather than 
them having to succumb to nihilism. Though extreme piety existed within some units and 
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among certain individuals, the ‘diffusive Christianity’ thought characteristic of the 
contemporary British society at the time was not such a huge influencer in the trenches 
as one may have thought.347 The spirituality that manifested in the trenches was much 
less institutionally guided than rising from an inward turned sense of spirituality and 
superstition.348 Soldiers adopted rituals as superstitious bargaining tools against death: 
Arthur Wrench recorded a manifestation of everyday superstition of men who he said 
carried New Testament in their breast pockets in the hope that it might stop a bullet from 
entering their hearts ‘even if its only other use,’ as Wrench would go on to say, ‘is for 
convenient piece of paper to light a cigarette.’349 Amulets and rituals were tangible, but 
their popularity stemmed from the religious implication that following certain ‘rules’ 
could be the ticket to one’s salvation. In order to control their own fate, soldiers gravitated 
towards actions that helped them maintain the illusion that they had a say in whether or 
not they would die. This is evident in an instance of a British soldier who was captured 
by Germans in 1917 and attributed his deliverance from danger not directly to God but to 
the fact that he dutifully prayed throughout combat.350 
In the Great War diaries and letters of Kitchener’s army, death features prominently time 
and time again, and it is written about in a variety of tones – sometimes even in a positive 
light. Just like the euphemisms that soldiers had for when they killed an enemy, they had 
a list of ways to refer to the death of their comrades that sounded less worse than ‘getting 
killed’ or ‘dying’. A comrade might ‘go West’, ‘go under’, or ‘go out of it’, or they may 
be ‘knocked out’ like their enemy counterparts.351 According to Watson, humour in the 
Great War was used widely to re-interpret the environment positively to make it seem 
less threatening.352 Mockery in particular played a significant role for the soldiers: while 
it was easy to be frightened of a machinegun or shellfire, a weapon called ‘chattering 
Charlie’ appeared less frightening. Humour also enabled men to cope with their wishes 
as well as their fears: Humourous songs could air the soldier’s desire to be away from the 
war without it being taken as a statement of low morale or a weak character, and thus this 
outlet prevented the unspoken desires to overwhelm the soldiers and to prevent them from 
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doing their duty. In one popular song, both the fear for one’s own life and the resulting 
desire to leave the frontline was such that could not have been tolerated by the military 
hierarchy, had it not been voiced in such an ironic and light-hearted fashion: 
I want to go home, I want to go home / Coal boxes and shrapnel they whistle and roar I don’t want to go in 
the trenches no more / I want to go over the sea / Where the Kaiser can’t shoot bombs at me / Oh my! I 
don’t want to die / I want to go home.353 
Modern psychological research has found that humans demonstrate an increased liking 
for ‘hostile’ humour following uncontrollable experiences, and it seems that through 
humanizing the horror of the war, humour made the soldiers’ situation more manageable 
and kept men from becoming apathetic.354 Humour could even be used to alleviate the 
pressing sense of dread that came about when gas was introduced to the battlefield: While 
makeshift warning bells for gas were set up out of empty shell cases, one unit put up a 
sign next to one that read: ‘Beat this gong, grab your gun, and prepare to meet the bloody 
Hun.’355 
In the ascetic conditions of the trenches, even the most basic creature comforts could 
bring the men back from any pit, like when Private Fleet observed that ‘with rest, food 
and drink we became normal human beings again.’356 The importance of providing 
soldiers with enough and adequately varied sustenance is emphasized by military 
psychology even today, and food and rest are treated as the two most effective on-scene 
treatments to acute combat stress reactions.357 The trench timetable was also deliberately 
fixed throughout the war, and the monotony and routine probably helped dull soldiers’ 
consciousness of time, consequently hindering consideration for war’s duration while 
providing them with a sense of order to the entropy which surrounded them in a charge 
or an artillery barrage.358 Manwaring described the monotony of the life in the dugouts in 
a particularly heavily shelled area: 
Packed like sardines we lie and try to snatch some moments' sleep; shave in our breakfast tea, and clean 
our teeth in our lunch-time coffee, and wash not at all. With revolvers by our sides, and respirators on our 
chests, we live in the perpetual night of underground, coming to the surface to work or see a little of God's 
sunshine, or explore as shells permit and the spirit moves us. Time as a measure has ceased to be and our 
watches serve just as checks on our movements.359 
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Because of the prolonged times of inactivity that prevailed in trench warfare, many 
soldiers would focus on the weather and conditions to avoid the other aspects of their 
unfortunate circumstances. Vermin that cohabited the dugouts with the soldiers were 
likened to the enemy through humour, which could be used to reinforce enmification 
through proxy.360 Perhaps the most blatant and tangible forms of avoidance was the 
constant card playing in the trenches, which was ubiquitous during shellfire, and how 
some soldiers would even engage in folk singing during bombardments to distract 
themselves.361 The soldiers seldom thought too far ahead as it may have led to them 
considering the likelihood that they may not make it until the end of the war. 
Even if the men were by and large efficient at avoiding constant thoughts of their own 
death, there was one instance which could almost without fail penetrate through the layers 
of soldiers’ self-preserving mechanisms of willful ignorance. Edward Norman Gladden, 
who had begun his civil career just before the war as a junior civil servant and would go 
on to gain recognition on the field later in life, describes experiencing such event as a 
soldier after the dust had settled on the battlefield: 
Never before had I seen a man who had just been killed. A glance was enough … The smell of blood mixed 
with the fumes of the shell filled me with nausea. Only a great effort saved my limbs from giving way 
beneath me. I could see from the sick grey faces of the file that these feelings were generally shared. A 
voice seemed to whisper with unchallengeable logic, ‘Why shouldn’t you be next?’362  
The sight of a corpse could trigger the most primal of all fears, especially if the victim 
was freshly deceased or someone the soldier had known. Wilfrid Ewart, who had received 
a commission for his good pedigree despite of his poor health, recorded seeing a whole 
company unable to keep from turning to witness a dead man who seemed almost asleep, 
and being visibly shaken as a result.363 Charles Bird observed that ‘for weeks the men 
suffer from intense fright as comrades are killed or horribly mutilated.’364 The experience 
thereafter, of observing the dead and imagining the circumstances of their death by 
drawing from the vivid and often gruesome details of the carnal state of the bodies while 
relating it all to the thought of their own mortality, can be read from the pages written by 
some soldiers who showed startling levels of fascination with the corpses of the fallen. 
The trivial attitude and mundane thoughts that got mixed in with the macabre imagery are 
                                                          
360 Quinn & Trout 2001, 41. 
361 Watson 2008, 105. 
362 N. Gladden quoted in Winter 1979, 133. 
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the following decades. 
364 Bird 1917, 333. 
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evidence to both how jaded some soldiers were to the scenes they had witnessed over and 
over again, and the force with which their unconscious minds were working to divert their 
attention and compartmentalize the visions presented to it. Young Private Thomas Hope 
wrote about his own special encounter with a dead man, which is jarringly different from 
the deeply emotional occasion described above: 
Death lies about in all its forms. A limbless body here, the tunic fitting the swollen body like a glove. He 
may have wanted a tunic to fit him like that all his life – he gets it in death. A body without a head like a 
rumjar without a label. A form fast turning green, lying in a pool of grey-green gas vomit. Death in a 
thousand different masks. A youngster not much older than myself is bringing his inside up. Poor blighter. 
It’s a pity. Heaven knows when our next rations will arrive.365 
In instances where a soldier found himself wounded, he would cease any thoughts about 
the battle itself. Commonly the soldiers recall a profound state of exhaustion, such as one 
soldier felt after being buried by dirt after shellfire. He could not quite decide whether he 
was alive or not, and recalls only wanting to sleep.366 The concern the soldiers had 
towards those they had left home on occasion exceeded the regard for their own lives, 
and The Field Service Post Card, which in itself is a testament to the uniform and identity 
erasing army culture, was most often sent home right after battle, with everything crossed 
out except ‘I am quite well’.367 The focus of soldiers was also often not on the pain they 
themselves experienced on the fields, but the suffering of those at home who they’d be 
leaving behind. A military padre described a situation where on the eve of a battle once, 
a soldier had approached him to tell him the addresses of his father and his sweetheart so 
that the padre could write to them if he fell. ‘In the last battle,’ he had said, ‘one of my 
brothers was killed and another wounded. If I fall I shall die without regrets and with a 
heart content; but it will go hard with those at home… These are terrible times for those 
at home.’368 
Sometimes the men could enter a state in which soldiers worn down by mental or physical 
exhaustion became so passive and indifferent that they took very little trouble to protect 
themselves.369 This apathy could be interpreted to have been the result of emotional 
desensitization. Former U.S. Army psychologist Paul Ekman has proposed that out of the 
six distinct ‘basic emotions’ (anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, and surprise), the 
ones most susceptible to desensitization are fear, happiness, and sadness.370 Prolonged 
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366 E. Kingsbury quoted in Winter 1979, 194. 
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exposure to killing and the threat of being killed wore men down: In the Second World 
War G. W. B. James observed that by late 1942 there was 'a complete and utter exhaustion 
which recalled some of the days in the 1914-18 war, when men coming out of the line 
would look wrinkled, yellow and apathetic.'371 According to him, troops 'got tired of 
fighting’ and that brief periods of time away from the frontline 'did little to restore the 
cumulative effects of constant mental strain.'372 As the soldiers developed greater 
awareness of danger as time passed on the front, they became both increasingly fatalistic 
of the possible consequences, and less likely to engage in a battle that did not seem worth 
the risk. By Watson’s interpretation, these risk-assessment strategies lay at the heart of 
men’s adaptation to the Western Front, and as the time the soldiers spent on the front 
increased, the differences between their abilities to cope with the prolonged stress became 
more apparent.373 Similarly, however, after a time the duration of service had weeded out 
those who could not deal with the reality of trench warfare. For the British, a sample of 
two hundred British troops suffering from psychiatric disorders discovered that their 
average length of field service was at ten months.374 
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4. Conclusions 
This study examined the war experience of British middle-class volunteers of Kitchener’s 
army in the Great War trenches. The purpose of this study was to understand how the war 
affected the soldiers, and why they reacted to it the way they did. In answering these 
questions, the study aimed to uncover how this group of people experienced the Great 
War to better the understanding of both how the War was shaped by its combatants, and 
how the War shaped them in turn. Through offering an interpretation of how the first 
modern war affected its soldiers, the study also strove to add to the pool of knowledge 
which examines the questions of how humans psychologically respond to industrial 
warfare. 
To answer the study’s primary research questions, the Great War was examined through 
four features, which were deemed to have been most integral to shaping the combatants’ 
experience of the war. These features were; the military organization, the soldiers’ 
brothers in arms, the act of killing, and the threat of dying. The method with which these 
aspects of the war were studied was the analysis of the soldiers’ self-reported experiences 
of the war through letters and diaries they wrote in the trenches, and their retrospective 
war memoirs. To better understand the soldiers’ perspective, works of both historical and 
psychological research literature were also utilized to contextualize their experiences 
within the broader contemporary British middle-class culture, and the studied 
psychological responses to war. The findings of this study benefited from the theoretical 
framework which studied the soldiers’ experience as shaped by their psychology, and 
coloured by their cultural context; and through these means, the study was able to find 
adequate answers to its primary research questions.  
The British military organization was found to be one of the two features of the Great 
War which by and large helped the soldiers to carry on. The British Expeditionary Force 
formed an underlying hierarchy structure which took Kitchener’s middle-class recruits 
from the world they had inhabited as civilians, and into an environment which 
emphasized the group over the individual while demanding strict deference to its in-built 
hierarchies. Upon joining the army, the recruits were almost completely removed from 
their old social context and introduced to a system which dictated their every move while 
also sustaining them and intentionally enforcing bonding between the men who shared 
the experience with one another. The soldier’s brothers in arms were the human 
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component woven into the larger system of the military. The middle-class members of 
Kitchener’s army formed relationships with their fellow soldiers which have been 
recounted by many of them to have been their highest source of motivation for continuing 
with the war when it became unbearable. The military code of conduct was informed by 
the wider systems of social stratification of contemporary Britain, which mostly helped 
with members of different social classes to adapt into their roles in the army. The social 
relationships the men formed with one another became a psychological and emotional 
crutch through which they could tolerate their circumstances on the front, which were 
often near-unbearable, however made easier by the shared camaraderie. 
As one of the most potentially traumatic human experiences, the act of killing formed one 
of the core elements of Kitchener’s soldiers’ war experience. It was one of the two strains 
of war which represented a counterpoint to the two psychologically sustaining features of 
the war. The primary sources were examined through both Dave Grossman’s model of 
five stages of killing, and the conscious and unconscious defense and coping mechanisms 
which are triggered in times of stress. Out of these psychological mechanisms, evidence 
of rationalization, dehumanization, and desensitization featured most prominently in the 
used primary sources. The other traumatic feature of the war was the threat of dying, 
which the soldiers also had to learn to cope with if they wished to perform their role 
effectively. Through using Elizabeth Kübler-Ross’ model of five stages of grief, the 
soldier’s texts were examined to make sense of how they were approaching the prospect 
of their own death. The soldiers’ reactions were also examined through conscious and 
unconscious defense and coping mechanisms, of which positive illusions, religion and 
superstition, and humour featured most prominently in the primary sources. 
What this study’s results imply is that while the soldiers had distinctly individual 
experiences of their own, they were characterized by a set of culturally and 
psychologically guided features, which hold within themselves a level of predictability. 
The middle-class background of the studied soldiers provided them with a distinct level 
of similarity, while their reactions could also be understood through analyzing them from 
the perspective of modern psychological research. Of the four features of war studied, the 
communal aspects of the military hierarchy and one’s brothers in arms seem to have been 
key in helping the men persevere and continue fighting. Through the help of their fellow 
soldiers, the ones who survived the war with their psyche intact could face the two 
principal strains of war – the act of killing and the threat of dying – without collapsing. 
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The soldiers’ mental mechanisms of coping were interwoven with their social identity, 
and the culture of the British middle-class men in the Great War informed them of their 
purpose and role in the conflict. Nevertheless, they still required the continuing presence 
and support of the social aspects of the battlefield to realize their purpose there.  
The scope of this study sets some limitations to the reliability of its conclusions, as the 
nature and amount of source material used to draw the study’s conclusions contain only 
a small section of the Kitchener’s middle-class volunteers. However, the nature of the 
study’s chosen theoretic framework and research tradition means it also only represents 
one possible interpretation of the soldiers’ experience, grounded in historical 
interpretation. Though while doing so it ultimately both simplifies the nuances in the 
experiences of each individual, as well as makes generalizations of the whole based on a 
few sampled accounts, the results are not unreliable. Rather they represent a valuable 
addition to the general discussion of the British soldiers’ experiences on the Western 
Front, and have raised new questions such as to what extent were the soldiers conscious 
of their own situation: If they were they aware of the social pressures which drove them 
to join the Kitchener’s volunteers in the first place, and how much of the defense and 
coping mechanisms used by them were conscious ways to avoid their immediate reality? 
As such, any future research could build on this study’s results examining in more detail 
one of the four features examined in this study. They could also expand on how it both 
influenced the soldiers in its own right, and in conjunction with the other studied aspects 
of the war. From the soldiers’ perspective, as the scientific understanding of the human 
psyche expands and becomes more accurate, historical wars could be revisited and re-
analyzed for a more informed understanding of the experience of past soldiers as they 
went to war from a variety of cultural backgrounds.  
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Appendices 
 
Picture 1: A Field Service Postcard. Field Service Postcards were used by soldiers on active service to send speedy 
messages home without needing for censoring by their officers. Their purpose was to swiftly communicate to their 
loved ones that they were alive and well and to confirm that mail was received on the Front. The soldier was allowed 
to delete as appropriate from a selection of pre-printed sentences, yet if anything other than a date and signature were 
added, the card would be destroyed. 
